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Interpreting Contracts in a Regulatory
State
By ADITI BAGCHI*

W

HEN CONTRACTING PARTIES GO TO COURT, it is usually to
dispute what their contract requires of them.1 If the language of their
agreement is not clear, courts enforce the most reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous contract term.2 Sometimes that is the most reasonable reading of a written agreement. At other times, it is the most
reasonable understanding of what a person has said or done.3 Either
way, the content of a contractual obligation turns on its most reasonable interpretation.
What is the most reasonable interpretation? Courts usually determine the most reasonable understanding of a contractual obligation
by reference to the parties’ intentions, as evidenced by their words
and acts.4 But reasonableness is not reducible to party intent.5 In ordi* Professor of Law, Fordham University Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; M.Sc.,
Oxford University; A.B., Harvard College. The Article has benefited from workshops at
Fordham Law School and Harvard Law School, and a conference at Venice International
University. Special thanks to Hanoch Dagan, Abner Greene, John Goldberg, Martijn
Hesselink, Clare Huntington, Joseph Raz, Henry Smith, and Ben Zipursky for comments
and discussion.
1. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1581, 1582 (2005). See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott,
Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 25–34
(2014) (discussing the competing interpretative positions taken by courts when interpreting contracts in dispute); see generally David A. Dilts, Of Words and Contracts: Arbitration and
Lexicology, 60 DISP. RESOL. J. 41, 43 (2005) (describing how labor arbitration developed the
rules of contract construction because resolution for labor-management contract disputes
rely heavily on the interpretation of the language’s meaning).
2. Sutton v. E. River Sav. Bank, 55 N.Y.2d 550, 555 (1982) (“Our goal must be to
accord the words of the contract their ‘fair and reasonable meaning.’”). This Article concerns the interpretation of ambiguous terms. In line with existing law, it presumes that unambiguous terms are either enforced in a manner consistent with their unavoidable
meaning or rejected altogether.
3. See, e.g., Embry v. Hargadine, Mckittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1907) (holding that a conversation can constitute a valid contract of law if only one
party had a right to understand a conversation as intending to create a contract).
4. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010)
(“[T]he parties’ intentions control.”); ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Freeport Welding &
Fabricating, Inc., 699 F.3d 832, 842 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The primary concern of a court
35
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nary and legal usage, reasonableness is itself a tricky concept. Usually,
when we ask whether a person behaved reasonably (such as, “was that
a reasonable tip for the waiter?”), we ask whether they behaved appropriately or fairly. When we say that an obligation or standard of conduct is reasonable (such as, “tipping a waiter twenty percent is
reasonable”), we similarly claim that it is appropriate and fair to hold
someone to that obligation or standard.
It is less clear what courts mean when they adopt a “reasonable”
interpretation of a written statement of obligation. For example, if I
promise to reimburse you for all labor costs in connection with transporting heavy equipment, whether this covers the costs of repairing
your truck to render it suitable for the job may depend on what the
court believes we had in mind, or it could take into account market
practice directly. That is, a reasonable interpretation of the obligation
could be a reasonable guess about what parties meant by their words, or
it can seek to derive a reasonable obligation from those words. Usually,
what contracting parties had in mind will dovetail with common business practices, so a wrenching choice between these possible meanings is unnecessary—but the intentions of contracting parties will not
always mirror other indicia of reasonableness in this way. Sometimes
people intend to contract on unreasonable terms.
Courts already, if inconsistently, read ambiguous contracts to impose substantively reasonable obligations.6 In searching for the most
construing a written contract is to ascertain the true intent of the parties as expressed in
the instrument.”); Walker v. Martin, 887 N.E.2d 125, 135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“[I]t is the
court’s duty to ascertain the intent of the parties at the time the contract was executed as
disclosed by the language used to express their rights and duties.”); Flores v. Lower E. Side
Serv. Ctr., Inc., 4 N.Y.3d 363, 368 (2005) (“In determining whether the parties entered into
a contractual agreement and what were its terms, it is necessary to look . . . to the objective
manifestations of the intent of the parties as gathered by their expressed words and
deeds.”); Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Eastside Props., Inc., 704 P.2d 681, 685 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985) (“Where the parties’ contractual language is ambiguous, the principal goal of construction is to search out the parties’ intent.”); Robert F. Felte, Inc. v. White, 302 A.2d 347,
351 (Pa. 1973) (“When interpreting a contract the intention of the parties must be
determined.”).
5. Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Stahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and
Experiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1753, 1759–60 (2017) (arguing that courts should use polls
to decide meaning because common understanding of terms should control).
6. See, e.g., Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 661 N.W.2d 776, 787 (Wis. 2003)
(“In ascertaining the meaning of a contract that is ambiguous, the more reasonable meaning should be given effect on the probability that persons situated as the parties were
would be expected to contract in that way as opposed to a way which works an unreasonable result.”); Glenn Distribs. Corp. v. Carlisle Plastics, Inc., 297 F.3d 294, 301 n.4 (3d Cir.
2002) (“Courts must be mindful to adopt an interpretation of ambiguous language which
under all circumstances ascribes the most reasonable, probable, and natural conduct of
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reasonable meaning of a text, courts do not limit themselves to evidence of parties’ thinking; they take into account what a fair meaning
would be, or what parties owe each other in light of background legal
norms.7 Courts are right to do so,8 and we should update our scholarly understanding of contract interpretation to reflect this more expansive understanding of reasonableness.9
The reigning debate about contract interpretation does not address this matter. The debate is largely between those who would allow
(or require) courts to consider evidence of contractual context and
those who would sharply delimit the inquiry by directing courts to rely
first (and sometimes last) on the text of written agreements.10 Both
sides of this debate assume that meaning turns just on what conthe parties, bearing in mind the objects manifestly to be accomplished.”) (internal citations omitted); Tessmar v. Grosner, 128 A.2d 467, 471 (N.J. 1957) (“Even where the intention is doubtful or obscure, the most fair and reasonable construction, imputing the least
hardship on either of the contracting parties should be adopted so that neither will have
an unfair or unreasonable advantage over the other. These rules apply in all circumstances, whether the agreement be integrated or unintegrated.”) (internal citations omitted). Courts that invoke substantive reasonableness do not usually announce indifference
to party intent; instead, they treat a substantive analysis as the basis for imputing a particular intent to the parties. In each of these cases, though, at least one of the parties disavows
having had any such intent, and it seems unlikely that courts believe that parties always
intend to treat each other fairly. The practice of nevertheless assuming parties acted reasonably does not have to be explained by a substantive commitment to reasonableness, but it is
best explained that way. Since courts usually aim to resolve disputes on the greatest common ground, they have no reason to pick the theoretical fight that this Article mounts.
7. Background legal norms may be hard legal norms that clearly announce the
boundaries of legality (e.g., you may not park on X street from 9am-5pm) or soft legal
norms that animate a set of cases or doctrines. For example, the soft legal norm that favors
market price is the norm against unjust enrichment. See generally Gregory C. Shaffer &
Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International
Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 707 (2010) (describing legal positivist, rationalist, and
constructivist conceptions of hard and soft law).
8. Larry Cunningham has observed that courts do not seem inclined to make the
stark choices regarding interpretative methodology that scholars would set up for them. See
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Contract Interpretation 2.0: Not Winner-Take-All But Best-Tool-for-theJob, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1625, 1627 (2017) (observing that courts do not use either
textualist or contextualist approaches exclusively). Similarly, courts have proven capable of
affording party intention priority even while giving due weight to background legal norms.
9. The Second Restatement of Contracts section 203(a) provides that “an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to
an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect,” and section
207 expressly allows that “in choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof, a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Unfortunately, these principles have not permeated the standard theory of contract interpretation.
10. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926
(2010) (advocating formalism); see STEVE J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 21–28 (2009) (advocating middle course of “objectivism”); Shawn J. Bayern, Rational

38

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

tracting parties intended; the controversy surrounds the method most
likely to get that inquiry right.11 Indeed, some scholars have suggested
that even the correct interpretive methodology might depend on the
preferences of parties to a transaction.12
Most of the time, contract interpretation should and does largely
center on ferreting out party intent. But that is only because in the
vast majority of cases, parties intend to contract on proper and fair
terms.13 Some parties self-consciously intend to contract on terms that
comply with background duties. In other cases, parties’ material interests and the balance of power between them result in terms that comply with background duties. And still in other cases, parties’
understanding of their interests and prerogatives is so deeply influenced by background duties that they comply without self-consciously
attending to those duties. Contract terms rarely flout background duties, and when they are clearly inconsistent, those terms are held
against public policy.14
Contract terms do not usually clearly violate public policy. More
often, contract terms could be read as either consistent or inconsistent with background legal duties. Scholars have failed to recognize
that where there is some doubt about whether terms are compliant
with background duties, terms are read so as to render them compliant.
Indeed, even when written terms are merely in potential tension with
public policy, they are read to align squarely with background duties
unless there is affirmative evidence that the parties intended otherIgnorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CAL.
L. REV. 943 (2009) (advocating contextualism).
11. See Shafar Lifshitz & Elad Finkelstein, A Hermeneutic Perspective on the Interpretation
of Contracts, 54 AM. BUS. L. J. 519, 524 (2017) (noting common premise). This Article
delves into the questions of “the use of government authority and the power of enforcement” that Lifshitz and Finkelstein put aside. Id.
12. See Uri Benoliel, The Interpretation of Commercial Contracts: An Empirical Study, 69
ALA. L. REV. 469, 470 (2017) (reporting that most commercial parties include terms that
imply that they prefer textualism).
13. Indeed, Eyal Zamir defends a primary role for substantive reasonableness on the
grounds that it actually better realizes party intention. Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of
Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1715 (1997). Zamir also
demonstrated the ways in which the standard account misses interpretation on the ground.
He argues that substantive reasonableness is given inadequate weight in orthodox theories
of interpretation and cites numerous cases in distinct doctrinal lines that show how courts
directly reference fairness and justice. Id. This Article complements Zamir’s work in that it
aims to justify the style of interpretation that Zamir observes and defends. However, it
grounds the move to substantive reasonableness in a theory of shared authority over
contract.
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178–179 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); See
generally 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 161–62.
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wise (or a “clear statement” to that effect).15 This kind of angled interpretation is familiar to us—and to judges—from the quite separate
context of statutory interpretation. The canon of constitutional avoidance, discussed further below, prefers interpretations that render
a statute clearly permissible over those that would skirt
unconstitutionality.16
The weight assigned to background legal norms in contract interpretation does not depend on the preferences of contracting parties
any more than the weight of constitutional norms in statutory interpretation depends on legislators’ interest in abiding by the Constitution. In the case of contract, the state’s interest in promoting the
substantive policy that bears on a given transaction is balanced against
the state’s interest in deferring to parties’ choice of terms. Because
courts expressly assert background duties only in those cases where
there is the specter of noncompliance, those duties operate mostly in
the shadows of interpretation. However, these duties are conceptually
critical to a legitimate practice of contract interpretation. The aim of
this Article is to excavate and clarify the role that background legal
duties play.17
The tension in case law between the dominant language of party
intent on the one hand, and occasional references to substantive reasonableness on the other, reflects a deep tension in the state’s attitude
toward contract. A liberal state like ours is committed both to regulating the market to promote justice and protect people from harm as

15. See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 77, 83 (2002) (requiring
clear statement by parties of a mutual intent to subject agreement to arbitration).
16. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 398–414 (2010) (reading the statutes addressing federal mail and wire fraud statutes as applying only to bribes and kickbacks in order to avoid potential problem of unconstitutional vagueness); Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such a construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”). See also infra note 160
and accompanying text.
17. The aim here is not to argue that background norms should displace authorial
intent in interpretation, but to show how the exercise of normative interpretation gives
them each due weight. One might contrast this view with a simple pluralism whereby
courts sometimes look to authorial intent and other times give background norms primary
consideration. While the weight assigned to different interpretive criteria surely vary by
contract-type, we would expect some constant principles—elaborated here—to direct
when and how each reference should figure in the interpretive process. Cf. Shawn Bayern,
Contract Meta-Interpretation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1097, 1102 (2016) (“[C]ontract law
should be pluralistic in the possibilities of interpretive regimes it considers.”).
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well as maximizing our sphere of autonomy in private affairs.18 These
goals compete in the domain of contract: The former commitment to
regulating the market weighs in favor of taking the state’s substantive
preferences over contract terms into account in the course of enforcing ambiguous terms. The commitment to private autonomy entails a
more formal approach limited to deciphering parties’ own intentions.
Every incursion into a private transaction that is intended to promote
systemic goals or protect third parties has the effect of narrowing the
scope of individual choice in contracting.
The trade-off between public purpose and private choice is not
new, but as a tension within the law, it is not ancient either. Under
Lochner v. New York,19 it might very well have been appropriate—or at
least consistent—to interpret contracts with almost exclusive attention
to party intent. Lochner struck down a New York state statute that limited the number of hours that bakers could work in a day and in a
week on the grounds that it was an “unreasonable, unnecessary, and
arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal
liberty.”20 The case stood for a broad doctrine of economic liberty
under which individuals were free to contract on the terms of their
choosing with little interference from the state.21 Under Lochner, the
state’s interest in preserving a free space where individuals choose the
terms on which they deal with others did not compete with a state
interest in regulating the marketplace because the latter was not a
valid exercise of its police power.22
But the Lochner era is long over. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,23
the Supreme Court reversed its course of resistance to the New Deal
and upheld a Washington State minimum wage statute. More important, the seventy years since the New Deal have witnessed an explosion
in statutory regulation of commerce and administrative oversight of
18. These dual aims are evident in the canonical liberal theory of John Rawls, which
requires the state both to maximize liberties and regulate the basic structure under the
difference principle. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 279–80 (Lerner Publ’g Grp. 2018) (1651) (providing a foundation for modern
political thought highlighting the relationship between law and crime to show that the
state objective is to protect people from harm).
19. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
20. Id. at 56.
21. Id.
22. “[W]e think that a law like the one before us involves neither the safety, the
morals, nor the welfare, of the public, and that the interest of the public is not in the
slightest degree affected by such an act.” Id. at 57.
23. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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the market.24 Although we remain reluctant to interfere in private exchange, and though some observers remain dogmatically opposed,
regulation of private exchange is now commonplace.25
Regulation of exchange removes intent as an exclusive anchor to
private obligation in the context of commercial transactions. Still,
contractual intent retains a privileged status in modern contract law,26
as well as in the account offered here. Courts are appropriately focused on the overlapping points of agreement between contracting
parties and focused in the ways each reasonably understood the other.
Contract and its legal offshoots (including much of business law) are
distinctive in law because of the weight they assign parties’ own
choices. In fact, as discussed further below, contract has a special
place in a liberal regime due to the deference it affords private persons in their choices of whom to deal with and on what terms. When
courts give legal effect to private commitments, they allow individuals
to rewrite the normative ties that bind persons to others in a political
economy. Contract thereby expands the scope of moral agency.
Liberal states are especially sensitive to the advantages of allowing
private individuals to control their relations with others, but they are
also interested in regulating the justice of the marketplace.27 Individuals engaged in exchange constitute public markets with public consequence. Parties to exchange can harm each other and others.28 States
are thus interested in the terms of private exchange.
Our modern regulatory state can, and sometimes does, directly
regulate those terms. Mandatory systems like tort directly control the
terms on which individuals deal with one another. Federal and state
statutes, and their related administrative agencies, focus on matters
ranging from consumer protection,29 labor or employment,30 securi24. See generally, Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41
J. ECON. LIT. 401 (2003) (discussing the increase in statutory regulation to support a Posner-inspired regulatory model).
25. The Cato Institute and the Ludwig von Mises Institute are exemplars of libertarian
thought—and opposition to most market regulation—in contemporary political discourse.
See Brian Doherty, A Tale of Two Libertarians, MISES INST. (Feb. 15, 2010), https://
mises.org/library/tale-two-libertarianisms [https://perma.cc/6NCR-YGMT].
26. See cases cited supra note 4 and accompanying text.
27. See RAWLS, supra note 18.
28. See generally Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 211 (2015)
[hereinafter Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts] (arguing that contract law does not adequately
account for harms that individuals can inflict on others or third parties).
29. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012); see Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301–399 (2012); see also Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903, 1928 (2013) (Appendix: FiftyState Survey: State Consumer Protection Laws). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
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ties,31 insurance,32 health care,33 antitrust,34 and civil rights,35 all of
which constrain the terms of acceptable exchange. Private contract, or
at least its voluntary dimension, is an alternative to those regimes. In
the realm of private agreement, states capitalize on the economic and
moral advantages of allowing parties to use private information about
their own preferences to navigate a web of bilateral relations.
But background duties that the law leaves individuals to navigate
on their own persist in a regime of contract—not only morally, but
legally. Our choices about how to transact with others are subject to
moral constraints. Some of these are entirely private such as the duty
not to charge a friend more than market price in most cases. But
some moral duties have legal status too. Duties of reciprocity, fair play,
and no exploitation are manifest in legal duties inside and outside of
contract; those duties are not suspended but apply precisely in the
context of private exchange. The background duties I refer to
30. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (2012); Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111–12117 (2012); Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012);
Occupational and Safety Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151–189 (2012); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2101–2109 (2012). Other important regulation of employment, including additional
minimum floors, workers’ compensation, and unemployment insurance schemes, takes
place at the state level.
31. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77mm (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2012).
32. Most states have adopted model laws promulgated by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners. See, e.g., UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT §§ 1–15 (NAT. ASS’N OF
INS. COMM’R 2004); REPLACEMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES MODEL REGULATION
§§ 1–10 (NAT. ASS’N OF INS. COMM’R 2015); MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES
ACT §§ 1–9 (NAT. ASS’N OF INS. COMM’R 1997).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-3 (2012), invalidated by Texas v. United States, 340 F.Supp.3d
579 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (prohibiting insurers from denying coverage based on pre-existing
medical conditions).
34. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012) (prohibiting price discrimination); Utah Pie v.
Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 700 (1967) (holding there was ample evidence to find
that Continental violated 15 U.S.C.§ 2a by price-fixing the Utah frozen pie market); Nw.
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293 (1985) (analyzing whether concerted refusals to deal are a per se violation Section 1 of Sherman Act).
See also FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435–36 (1990); Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378–81 (1973) (a facility deemed to be essential
may be required to make its facility available to competitors to avoid violating the Sherman
Act).
35. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a)–2000a(e) (2012) (outlawing racial discrimination
in places of public accommodation); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117 (2012) (outlawing employment discrimination on the basis of disability).
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throughout this discussion are immanent in existing legal norms; the
state has already backed them with its political authority. Voluntary
commitments in contract are undertaken in the shadow of these “political” duties, which do not encompass the full range of interpersonal
duties that parties owe each other. For example, they exclude private
duties of friendship. They do not exhaust the obligations of human
decency. The legal duties that properly inform contract interpretation
derive only from interpersonal, political duties already recognized by
the state.
It might be that self-interest and even private morality figure into
parties’ choice of contract terms more than background political duties. Indeed, I assume they do. But political duties are discharged in
contract regardless of whether contracting parties consciously think
about contract in that way. Even where a background duty does not
motivate a promise, it mediates between the obligation that an individual intends to assume (or avoid) and the ultimate scope of her legal
obligation. Penalty defaults are intended to force information out of a
party that might be tempted to withhold certain information.36 Interpretive defaults read the promisor’s words and acts so as to render
them reasonable. These defaults can effectively incorporate ideas of
substantive reasonableness that derive from involuntary duties operating in the background.37 Consider sticky interpretive defaults that require collective bargaining agreements and employment contracts to
very expressly waive the right to litigate discrimination claims, even
when less clear language would be strong evidence that the parties
intended to see the right waived.38 This is a different exercise than
36. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gerner, Filling the Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1989).
37. See, e.g., Morin Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Baystone Constr. Inc., 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir.
1983) (interpreting a clause with reference to a reasonable default notwithstanding evidence of contrary subjective intent). See also Larry A. DiMatteo, et al., The Interpretive Turn
in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 299, 320 (2004) (“Many of the CISG articles provide very general, vague default
rules tied to the concept of reasonableness.”). David Slawson further defines reasonableness with respect to contracts, claiming that under “the new meaning of contract,” contracts entail just those obligations that consumers would reasonably expect, though
businesses are free to spell out and define those obligations within the bounds of reasonableness. W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contract Law
by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L.R. 21, 28 (1984).
38. See Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 910 N.E.2d 317, 326 (Mass. 2009)
(describing courts’ interpretive rules in employment agreements where waiver of litigation
rights must be unambiguously stated); Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,
79–81 (1998) (stating that arbitration clauses for collective bargaining agreements must be
“particularly clear”).
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classic accounts of contract would expect; the latter would focus at
best on what the promisee might reasonably have understood the
promisor to intend. Yet defaults cannot be reduced to our best guess
about the parties’ intentions.
Involuntary duties thus inform the obligations we “freely” assume
when those obligations are not clearly specified.39 However, not all
moral duties are relevant to the particular perspective of the state at
the moment of adjudication. Whether courts should read our express
intentions in light of background duties depends on whether these
duties are of a political nature. Where courts can glean a background
duty from existing legal norms—in much the same way they already
extract principles of public policy from statutes, case law, and common law history40—promises made to discharge such a duty should be
interpreted in its light.
I call this method of interpretation “normative triangulation.”
Drawing from Donald Davidson’s concept of triangulation, Brian
Langille and Arthur Ripstein have suggested that contracts are and
should be interpreted by incorporating facts about the world into
party intent, irrespective of what parties actually thought about those
facts.41 We cannot know what others mean just by the sounds or marks
they make. We rely on language, and language has no meaning except
in the common space shared by speaker and listener.42 Ripstein and
Langille argue that in contract, as in ordinary speech, in light of the
inherent limitations on the intelligibility of others, we “must take his
or her beliefs to be largely true” and figure out what people are saying
“by finding a way to make most of what a speaker says come out
true.”43 The factual world thus serves as a reference point for filling in
apparent gaps in the meaning of words in contract.
39. As with other theories that speak to the selection of default rules, the interpretative method endorsed here applies primarily to contracts subject to some ambiguity. Such
ambiguity may arise because a written text is ambiguous; the initial determination of
whether the text is ambiguous or completely integrated is subject to some uncertainty; or
evidence of the terms of an oral agreement is subject to uncertainty. Where parties have
made a contractual term entirely clear, the court is left with the questions of enforceability
and remedy. Although my discussion of the sometimes competing interests of the state in
regulating exchange are relevant to the question of whether to enforce a term as well as
the scope of remedy available, I focus here on implications for interpretation.
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
41. See Brian Langille & Arthur Ripstein, Strictly Speaking—It Went Without Saying, 2
LEG. THEORY 63, 63–64, 74–75 (1996).
42. Barry C. Smith, Language, Conventionality Of, 5 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 368, 368–71 (Edward Craig ed., 1998).
43. Langille & Ripstein, supra note 41, at 73–74.
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The practice that I describe and defend here extends this
method to reference shared norms. Normative triangulation is doubly
normative. First, the facts at which it is directed, i.e., the objects of
interpretation, are normative. It aims to decipher the parties’ obligations toward one another under the contract. Second, normative triangulation is normatively motivated.44 The best method of
interpretation is the one that best advances the state’s policy agenda—
a normative agenda. As discussed further below, the state’s agenda
includes both attention to the agency interests of contracting parties
and broader substantive goals that implicate any two parties’ terms of
exchange. But in both respects the state’s interests have a strong
moral dimension. When a court looks to social practices and shared
social norms, it is not just as evidence of how parties likely understood
their agreement but also as evidence of the parties’ background duties
to each other. When social practices are inadequate, states can override prevailing private ideas about what parties owe each other and
move the ball forward in clarifying soft legal norms.45 The courts are
not just trying to figure out what parties were thinking. Courts try to
make what contracting parties actually said come out right—that is,
compliant with hard and soft legal norms.
My account of normative triangulation will proceed in three
parts. First, I will offer a schemata of a liberal state’s interests in contract regulation. These are broadly speaking of two sorts: promoting
the justice of public institutions and allowing space for private moral
agency. Both of these interests inform the kind of contract law a state
adopts, including its rules of interpretation. A liberal state plausibly
responds to the competing moral demands that it faces by conditionally and partially delegating its authority over transactions to the parties to exchange. That is, private parties share authority over their
transactions with the state, and private parties are the junior partners
in this arrangement.
The second part of the Article follows from the first. I will defend
an extension of one pillar of Davidsonian triangulation: Courts should
apply a “principle of charity” in their construction of contractual obli-

44. Cf. Robert H. Myers, Finding Value in Davidson, 34 CAN. J. PHIL. 107–36 (2004)
(arguing that we must assume that others’ values and desires, not just their reactions/
perceptions, are the same as our own, but on epistemic grounds).
45. For example, if it is unclear under the common law whether a bank must disclose
the range of possible interest rates that might apply to a loan, the legislature might clarify
the kinds of disclosures that are necessary to render the loan agreement enforceable.
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gation that reads obligations as compliant with background duties.46
The basic triangle in Davidson triangulation runs between a speaker
and her object, between object and interpreter, and between speaker
and interpreter. Davidson’s principle of charity holds that the interpreter should maximize agreement with the speaker or interpret the
speaker so as to make as much as possible of what she says true.47 The
principle follows from the relation between speaker and interpreter,
and in particular, the interpreter’s belief that they will respond similarly to stimuli.48 In the context of contract interpretation, a court
charitably reading an agreement will read it as in agreement with or in
compliance with background duties that attend exchange.
Courts’ reasons for applying a principle of charity are very different than those which motivate Davidson’s interpreter. I will argue that
the conditional delegation of authority to private parties gives states
content-dependent reasons49 for enforcing obligations. At this stage, I
will compare the aims of contract interpretation to those of statutory
and constitutional interpretation. Contracts and public legal instruments are both authored under bounded authority, but it is only in
contract where authority is actively shared with another institution
that has a simultaneous role.
The third part of the Article will further examine the implications
for how we interpret contracts. Most importantly, contractual intent is
not an exhaustive consideration in interpretation. I will also explore
the distinction between political and private background duties and
between equitable and public policy norms. I will illustrate how courts
already engage in normative triangulation.

I.

Shared Authority over Contract

Liberalism has a complicated relationship with contract. On the
one hand, a liberal state is committed to controlling the material consequences of contract. It has at least two bases for that commitment.
First, ensuring the justice of its basic structure requires the state to
46. See DONALD DAVIDSON, SUBJECTIVE, INTERSUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE 119, 148–49
(2001).
47. Langille & Ripstein, supra note 41, at 73.
48. See DAVIDSON, supra note 46, at 193–204.
49. A content-dependent reason is “a reason for conforming to a directive because
the directive has a certain content,” where content-independent reasons “are supposed to
be reasons simply because they have been issued and not because they direct subjects to
perform actions that are independently justifiable.” Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382, 389 (Jules L. Coleman et
al. eds., 2002).
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regulate the cumulative effects of private exchange.50 Distributive justice thus constrains contract as an allocative institution.51 Second, a
state should undertake to protect people from certain kinds of
harm.52 This includes both some of the harms inflicted within contractual relationships and harm to third parties from joint action.53
These two threads of the liberal state mandate generally call for vigilant oversight of private exchange.
On the other hand, a liberal state is uniquely sensitive to the
value of allowing individuals to contract as freely as possible.54 Contract is an alternative to tort and other mandatory regimes. Unlike
mandatory forms of regulation, contract allows individuals to choose
whom they deal with and on what terms. It allows individuals to give
expression to a range of preferences and values which together constitute the subject on which the liberal state is premised. From the standpoint of individuals in contract, private exchange entails granting
promises and permissions.55 The exercise of such normative powers
helps constitute parties as moral agents vis-à-vis strangers in civil soci50. See generally Samuel Scheffler, Distributive Justice, the Basic Structure and the Place of
Private Law, 35 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 213, 220–21 (2015) (discussing Rawls’s comparison of
tax and contract laws to show the distinctiveness of the “two kinds social rules” and how
they are governed and/or regulated by different social entities).
51. See generally Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 193 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract] (describing how consent to terms acts as a method of allocating
interpretation, thus justice, to an institution such as the state). Kevin A. Kordana & David
H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598, 605 (2005).
52. The strong and largely discredited liberal principle is that states should only undertake to prevent harm, but it is uncontroverted that protection from harm is an important state function. See JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 163 (Andrews UK Limited 2011) (1859).
See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (stating that under its powers of
parens patriae, the state authority to hospitalize the mentally ill is in furtherance of its compelling state interest of protecting other individuals from the harms caused by the mentally
ill).
53. See George M. Cohen, Implied Terms and Interpretation in Contract Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS VOLUME III: THE REGULATION OF CONTRACTS 78, 90
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000) (discussing how opportunism harms
contracting parties and causes a court’s intervention, stating that “the problem of opportunistic behavior is perhaps the key justification for court intervention in contracts”); Steven
Shavell, Contractual Holdup and Legal Intervention, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 346 (2007) (stating
that legal intervention in contract is justified where asymmetric information and externalities can cause harm to contracting parties).
54. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 2–4
(2017).
55. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Seana Shiffrin, Is a Contract a
Promise?, in ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 241 (Andrei Marmour ed.,
2012); see Daniel Markovits, Contracts and Collaboration, 113 YALE L. J. 1417 (2004) (explaining that promises are the substance of contracts).
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ety. A liberal state is committed to facilitating this process by which
citizens acquire moral identity.
We might attempt to do away with this tension by definition. That
is, we could interpret the autonomy principle to require only that the
liberal state refrain from regulating private conduct that has no consequence for third parties. But in complex societies almost every private
action gives rise to some third-party effects. The liberal commitment
to autonomy is best understood to weigh in favor of an expansive
sphere for individual agency even outside the vanishing space in
which private acts impose no burdens on others. This commitment
vaguely resembles the rhetoric of neo-liberal or libertarian approaches to economic regulation, but it is not a bar to legal intervention. The liberal commitment does, however, call for restraint in the
regulation of private exchange.
Historically, self-described liberal states were more attune to the
autonomy interests of contracting parties than to the moral interests
served by regulation.56 The tension between these interests is experienced more acutely now. The evolving stance of states largely reflects
new (or at least modern) recognition of the regulatory interest of the
state in ostensible private markets.57 We are also more aware of the
ways in which individual transactions may adversely affect third parties.58 And we have revised, too, our understanding of causation in
ways that make it possible to allocate responsibility and thus justify
imposing costs on contracting parties whose terms are socially deleterious.59 There have also been factual developments that press down
on the regulatory side of the conflict. Market integration accelerates
externalities because there is direct competition across a larger set of
exchanges, requiring parties to respond to terms offered elsewhere in
that set. Standardization amplifies third party effects because the scale
of a given term is no longer the market effect of one transaction but
of the entire market governed by that term. New technologies and the
expanded capacity of the administrative state have lowered the cost
and intrusiveness of regulation. These facts together make it tempting

56. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 54, at 10–11.
57. See Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, supra note 51, at 19.
58. See generally Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, supra note 28, at 212–13 (arguing that
contract law does not adequately account for harms that individuals can inflict on others or
third parties).
59. See Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
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to regulate transactions primarily by way of public law, but we do so at
the expense of the tailored flexibility of private ordering.60
The competing implications of liberalism for contract create unavoidable tension in the law governing transactions. States have allocated considerable space to private parties in setting the terms of
private transactions, but the boundaries of private authority are not
clearly established or stable. Rather than positing clear borders,
courts61 continuously negotiate the border by attempting to reconcile
a foundational commitment to parties’ intent with attention to the
objective reasonableness of the arrangements those parties propose.
A. The Regulatory Interests of a Liberal State
The evolution of contract regulation could be understood to
track the expansion of state power. In the United States, the expansion of the federal government’s formal regulatory powers coincided
with the erection of a full-blown administrative state during the New
Deal, and both surged again a few decades later during the Great Society.62 One might be tempted to relate both phenomena to a quelling
of typical liberal anxieties. That is, if liberals are fundamentally concerned with limiting state power, then the increased tolerance for regulation—or intervention—in private affairs may reflect the withering
of this foundational anxiety and its substitution with new concerns
about private power.63 People may worry less about state power because, however powerful the state may be, we now feel more immediately vulnerable to private power.
Whatever the merits of this cultural speculation, it is misguided as
an explanation for the last century’s expansion of regulation. Liberalism did not recede and thereby make room for regulation. Liberalism properly understood—in the United States, primarily with the
benefit of John Rawls and others like Ronald Dworkin—is itself the
intellectual impetus for much regulation.64
60. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319 (2002).
Private ordering is “[t]he sharing of regulatory authority with private actors.” Id. at 319.
61. This Article does not attempt to describe how all liberal states manage to reconcile public and private authority over contracts. Although many of my claims can be generalized to other states, my argument is focused on contract law in United States states.
62. See generally DANIEL ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940 1–8 (2014) (outlining the general history of the emergence of the American administrative state).
63. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 257–60 (1995).
64. See RAWLS, supra note 18; see generally Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1:
Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part
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The first important link between liberalism and contract regulation is distributive justice.65 Private law is among the pillars of the basic structure of society, and to the extent the rules of contract have
distributive consequences, those rules are constrained by the demands
of distributive justice.66 A more general argument for the relationship
between distributive justice and contract is outside the scope of the
present Article; in any case, distributive justice is just one of the public
functions of contract.
The state’s second regulatory interest regarding contract derives
from the political imperative to prevent certain kinds of harm. The
link has two aspects. Before I elaborate those, I will set aside the question of which harms count. The argument here requires only that we
accept that a state should protect citizens from injury, and these injuries include material (not just bodily) harm.67
The first set of harms for the state to target in contract regulation
are those that arise within the contractual relationship by way of deceit, exploitation, and contractual default. Patrick Atiyah saw these
harms as sufficient to explain the state’s interest in contract and
viewed the promissory framework as gratuitous and misleading, not
merely rivalrous—as I view it here.68
Contracting parties induce reliance in one another, and failure to
follow through on commitment thus results in economic harm. Contracting parties also sometimes contract on terms that are so much
worse than those available elsewhere such that one of the parties is
effectively worse off as a result of the contract if one takes into account her opportunity costs. Contracting parties may also exploit the
incompleteness of their agreements and shifting power relations over
the course of the contract to extract additional concessions and
destabilize the contract to the detriment of one of the parties. Contract law uncontroversially protects us from each of these harms to
various degrees.
The other harms regulated by contract regulation are externalities of contract. The state protects third parties from the contracts of
others.69 That is, contract cannot be used to inflict harm on third par2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981). Both Rawls and Dworkin defend
theories of justice that require the state to actively manage the economy, especially to limit
inequality.
65. See Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, supra note 51, at 1–5.
66. Id.
67. See HOBBES, supra note 18, at 279–80.
68. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 139–49, 687–89 (1979).
69. See Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, supra note 28.
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ties. While it is obvious that a contract should not be enforced where
it is designed with the express purpose of harming third parties, it is
less obvious to what extent contracting parties may incidentally undermine the value of third-party entitlements. We might be tempted to
say that parties to contract have no moral right to harm the interests
of others. But this would be unduly restrictive; a regime that disallowed any conduct, whether individual or joint, that adversely affects
others would leave an intolerably small space for individual freedom.
Individuals have a strong interest in being permitted to burden others
to some extent, but limiting that burden is among the legitimate functions of contract regulation.
The size and administrative capacity of the state makes it possible
to regulate exchange in ways that were not possible before, and this
expands the scope of what justice demands of the state. Economies of
scale make it cheaper to administer some kinds of regulation. Technology improves the information available to bureaucrats and, together with their evolving technocratic skill, improves the quality (and
lowers the social cost) of regulation.70 Even judges benefit from better
information about the decisions of their peers as a result of better
search engines and case law databases. New technology makes it possible to observe regulatory compliance with less personal attention by
relying instead on aggregate data. None of this makes contract regulation costless—if nothing else, the basic incursion on an apparently
private space remains—but in the balance of considerations, it cuts in
favor of regulation to protect the material interests of third parties.
The upshot is that the state has a legitimate interest in the terms
on which we deal with each other. Although contractual obligation is
characterized as the quintessential voluntary obligation in law,71 in
fact, contracts attempt to govern space that is already properly governed by ordinary law. A liberal state must pursue and effectuate distributive justice. It has to promote the material stability and
independence that individuals require in pursuit of their various life
plans, and this entails regulating contracts for future and third-party
effects. These legitimate interests of a state in contract manifest in
involuntary legal duties that limit free exchange, sometimes crowding
70. See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient?
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 895 (1999) (“[T]he relative efficiency with
which a particular regulatory regime maximizes a social welfare function depends on institutional and technological circumstances.”).
71. See Aditi Bagchi, Voluntary Obligation and Contract, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
433 (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Bagchi, Voluntary Obligation and Contract].
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out and sometimes crowding in voluntary contract. Regulatory interests crowd out the authority of private parties where parties have no
choice left to them—where they cannot choose to buy certain products considered dangerous, or where they cannot choose to be employed in a line of work considered demeaning. Regulatory norms
crowd in private authority over transactions insofar as they narrow the
range of acceptable, or enforceable, terms—where they limit price or
require the right of rescission.
B. The Nature of the Autonomy Interest
It is dangerous to even speak of autonomy in connection with
contract. This is because one might easily confuse the claim here—the
existence of an autonomy interest—with a more radical but widespread claim that contracting parties have rights and duties dictated
by the principle of autonomy. Scholars like Charles Fried, Jody Kraus,
and Randy Barnett (who are concerned with consent rather than
promise) are most explicit about such claims—though Fried may have
attenuated his claim since its original statement in Contract as Promise.72 One might also confuse the claim here with the claim by Seana
Shiffrin that the practice of promise, which serves our autonomy interests, constrains contract law because too great a divergence between
the law of contract and its closest ordinary moral practice threatens to
undermine the stability of the latter.73
Both of these kinds of claims are misguided because they reduce
contract to promise, or reduce contract in a way that misses the force
of liberal interests outside of individual autonomy, and because they
obfuscate even the implications of autonomy for contract. Less dogmatic versions of these theories, as advanced by Shiffrin, Daniel Markovits, and others, can channel values peripheral to the core
motivating values of autonomy, self-determination, or simply, control.74 These theories can channel peripheral values by allowing that
conditions for valid promise or consent—the conditions under which
state must support promise or recognize consent, or even the value of
72. FRIED, supra note 55; Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Promise, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
269, 319–20 (1986); Jody S. Kraus, Personal Sovereignty and Normative Power Skepticism, 109
COL. L. REV. SIDEBAR 126 (2009); Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise,
109 COL. L. REV. 1603 (2009). See also Charles Fried, Contract as Promise Thirty Years On, 45
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 961 (2012).
73. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV.
708, 713–15 (2007).
74. See Shiffrin, supra note 55. See generally Markovits, supra note 55, at 1467–80.
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promise or consent—may turn on other values. But the centering
value has a moral life of its own.
Our understanding of the demands of autonomy on the practice
of promise or the validity of consent plays out outside the law and
outside political morality. People make promises to others without invoking the law. People consent to arrangements that have no legal
force.75 Our understanding of when promise and consent are effective
is driven by those contexts, which often involve only two people and
raise no question of legal sanction. By describing contract as legal
promise or legal consent, we assert continuity over context in the
moral practice of promise and consent. We imply that the commitments people make in the context of legally binding exchange are
fundamentally of the same species as the commitments they make in
ordinary life—and if the promissory or consent framework is to do
any work, these commitments should be subject to similar (though
not identical) rules in and out of the law.
The psychological and moral import of terms like consent and
promise is not fully permeable by alien political-moral considerations;76 and the alien political-moral considerations are not reducible
to their impact on the quality of promise or consent. The effect of a
transaction between two people on other people or its effect on the
distribution of resources in a society might have some implications for
the values that inform promise and consent—but those implications
are incidental. Resting the legal significance of third-party externalities or distributive justice on their implications for the quality of
promise and consent distorts their significance. If the rules of interpretation and the conditions of enforceability depend just on the
quality of promise and consent, then contract law will fail to adequately attend to important aspects of exchange.
We might characterize the problem with most promissory and
consent-based theories of consent as a misallocation of authority. That
is, they begin with a false conception of contracting parties’ authority
over their own transactions. The normative powers of promise and
consent are ones we recognize because they are valuable to moral
agents,77 but these normative powers are always circumscribed.
75. For example, we might agree to meet for dinner or you might permit a friend to
skip your wedding so she can do a long-awaited audition.
76. Political-moral considerations are ones that pertain to the institutional context of
contract rather than the bilateral relationship, such as distributive justice or the effective
functioning of a market.
77. See DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE (2012).
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Outside of law, they are limited by the myriad interpersonal duties
that control our normative situation in ways that we cannot revise.78 In
the context of regulating private agreement, these normative powers
rival other interests of a state in the terms of exchange.79 While some
of those state interests coincide with the moral interests of agents in
the boundaries of their own normative powers, there is no reason to
believe that the conditions under which a state should recognize parties’ commitments as binding will perfectly coincide with those conditions under which promise and consent should be regarded as
effective as a general matter. Moral agency is enhanced by the powers
of promise and consent but over time, and for some more than
others, legally binding promises and consent can diminish autonomy
as well.80 Exchange, which is the legal subject of contract—not agreement, promise or declarations of consent per se—affects the autonomy of third parties and a variety of other interests relevant to state
regulation. Using regulation of exchange to promote our normative
powers is one thing; centering contract law around that function is
quite another.
The liberal interest in the autonomy of contracting parties is
about enhancing agency, not respecting jurisdiction. The claim here
is neither that principles of contract are morally determined by promise nor that contract must prop up the practice of promise. Instead,
the normative powers exercised in contract, which include but are not
limited to promise, are valuable exercises of agency; allowing space for
exercise of those powers expands moral agency.81 This claim does not
deny this interest might sometimes be outweighed by other aspects of
the liberal interest in transactions, and it does not favor correspondence between contract law and the moral laws of promise—in fact, I
have argued elsewhere that divergence between those regimes may be
morally valuable.82 It does, though, acknowledge a real cost to overriding voluntary obligation with involuntary duty.
In this section, I will first describe further how contract can be
understood to reflect normative powers, and then discuss why a liberal
78. For example, one can try to release a best friend from a duty of friendship, such as
the duty to visit one on one’s deathbed, where it is entirely feasible to do so; but arguably
the dying friend cannot release the other from this duty.
79. See supra Part I.A (describing state interests).
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (requiring
exchange for enforceability).
81. See OWENS, supra note 77, at 6–12.
82. See Aditi Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 709,
724–26. (2011) [hereinafter Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise].
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state should be especially interested in allowing individual space to
cultivate those powers. Combining the interests developed in the last
part with those here results in a picture of contract where the state has
an interest in allowing contractual freedom, but individuals lack freestanding authority over their transactions.
1. Normative Powers in Contract
Contract is regarded as voluntary because we assume contractual
obligations deliberately by communicating an intention to bind ourselves.83 Our ability to change normative relations by virtue of communicating an intention to do so implies the exercise of a normative
power.
Promising is the most discussed normative power; by making a
promise, an agent creates a new obligation where there was none
before. Consent is another classic normative power by which an agent
makes some action by another person permissible where it previously
was not. Because the concept of consent in contract theory has been
predominantly political—i.e., consent is usually granted to the state
and operates to justify state action84—I will separate out consent directed to another private person and, consistent with ordinary usage,
refer to the latter as permission. Like consent, permission is created by
communicating an intention to grant it. But permission is granted to
another private person.
Normative powers like promise and permission comprise an important element of our self-understanding as moral agents. But these
powers are not natural features of a person. Normative powers are
constructed by mutual recognition. If we fail to accept others as obligated when they purport to bind themselves, we deny them this moral
capacity. If we fail to regard ourselves as bound after holding ourselves
out as self-bound, we deny and thereby diminish our capacity to bind
ourselves. The general reason for respecting voluntary obligation is
respect for the moral capacity and picture of the moral agent that
makes such obligation possible.
83. See Bagchi, Voluntary Obligation and Contract, supra note 71.
84. This idea underpins social contract theories. See HOBBES, supra note 18, at 239; see
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE
ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT) AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 3, 49–50 (J. W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd., 3d ed. 1966) (1690); see
generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Christopher Betts, trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1994) (1762).
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The normative power of making binding promises is sometimes
recognized on the grounds that it facilitates valuable relationships, or
more generally makes it possible to shape one’s moral world.85 I do
not aim to propose a theory of promising as such, but I pull as a common element from most accounts of promising that the recognition
of the practice enhances moral agency. Promising makes it possible to
impose an imprint on one’s own moral world, whether generally or
through its specific aspects, such as one’s relationships with others.
The imprint reflects something about one’s self, one’s conceptions of
the good or life plan.
Although there has been less scholarly attention to the moral
value of permission, that value is perhaps even more isolatable as involving this capacity to direct and compose one’s normative relations.
When we trade one thing of value for another, we may manifest in the
world our otherwise subjective valuations of those things.
Institutions like contract that support the practice of promise and
permission increase the value of those normative powers for agents.
As I have argued elsewhere,86 support for the private practice of promise does not entail copying it; sometimes the legal practice of promise
should diverge from the ordinary practice in order to avoid crowding
it out. But the state enhances moral agency by allowing us to control
our moral position to a greater degree, especially by enabling us to
deliberately alter our position by communicating an intent to do so.
2. Liberalism and Normative Powers
I have claimed that a liberal state should be especially attentive to
the moral agency of its constituents, as promoted through the assumption of voluntary obligation. One might argue to the contrary that a
liberal state is properly indifferent to the moral makeup of citizens
and thus unfettered by any private autonomy interest where a proper
regulatory state interest obtains. Agnostic between claims about the
good life, it should not attempt to shape constituents in any particular
way.
Liberal perfectionists, similar to Joseph Raz, should be most sympathetic to the idea that the state should promote autonomy as a condition for individual flourishing.87 But even those who are
unprepared to endorse a mandate for the state to cultivate autonomy
85. See, e.g., OWENS, supra note 77, at 6–12.
86. See Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise, supra note 82.
87. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) (critiquing neutral liberal theory in favor of perfectionism).
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in a thick sense can endorse a mandate to promote agency. While a
conception of the good, in which individuals reflect on and shape
their lives on a range of dimensions, may exclude certain conceptions
of the good life that a modern liberal state cannot afford to exclude,
moral agency is a thinner goal.88 Its value to persons does not presuppose that we should be active in our choice of a conception of the
good; its value goes to the casting of a person as an agent, whatever
her conception of the good. Exercising agency by possessing the
power to shape one’s obligations and rights vis-à-vis others—sometimes exercising the power and sometimes withholding it, in line with
whatever conception of the good and however one came to identify
with it—is valuable to moral agents.
There are probably some conceptions of the good that do not
value moral agency, in that they do not posit it as an important dimension of the person. But those are already in tension with the liberal
project. For a liberal state purports to justify its powers derivatively
from the moral claims of its constituents. Its authority depends on it
fulfilling a moral function for its constituents. Its constituents have
obligations to be fulfilled through the state, and they can make claims
on the state and each other only inasmuch as they are conceived as
moral agents.
Liberalism starts with a picture of the person as a self-originating
source of value.89 The edifice collapses if we do not regard individuals
as capable of conferring value on their particular ends—capable of
making claims on others and having claims made on them. So central
is this feature of the person to liberalism’s working picture of herself
that a liberal state cannot afford to disregard it entirely even when the
substantive moral interests of those same individuals call for coercive
regulation. The state is in a dilemma every time it must weigh the
interests of one individual against another, as it must in the course of
regulation, because it is committed to not knowing how to value these
interests, let alone how to weigh them against each other. Any kind of
welfare analysis or analysis of the distribution of primary resources requires that the state adopt a working view about what people want; in
the absence of real knowledge, state actors are left to substitute their
ideas about what people must want. Even a state with the most liberal
motives is confronted with the reality of illiberal method in implemen88. See MATTHEW H. KRAMER, LIBERALISM WITH EXCELLENCE (2017) (critiquing existing
liberal perfectionist theories as “edificatory”).
89. See RAWLS, supra note 18, at 11 (defining justice as fairness by reference to what
free and rational persons would accept).
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tation. Avoiding that inevitable and uncomfortable moment calls for
leaving as much space as possible for individual agency. Humility in
the pursuit of even legitimate regulatory interests is the homage a liberal state pays to its normative foundations.
C. Conditional Delegation of Authority
In the realm of contract, the institutional form that such humility
takes is a conditional delegation of transactional authority to private
parties. Conditional delegation allows parties to choose their transactional partners and terms within parameters that are broadly consistent with the regulatory imperatives of the state. The state recognizes
parties as having acted within their authority only inasmuch as private
terms are compatible with background duties stipulated in statutory
law, administrative regulation, and case law. Many of these norms
bearing on the bounds of private authority are well-outside traditional
private law (e.g., all residential apartments must have hot water) while
others are local norms articulated within contract law itself (e.g., parties to a contract may not exploit shifts in bargaining power that are
the result of the contract itself). If a contract clearly flouts a background legal duty—such as a residential lease that purports to waive
any right to hot water, or a contract that allows one party to cancel for
any reason should performance no longer serve its interests—courts
will flatly refuse to enforce the contract as a violation of the housing
code, or for lack of mutuality or consideration. Parties have no right
to make those contracts.90
Many cases are less clear cut. Many leases are silent about providing hot water. In such a case, the court will read the lease as imposing
that duty on the landlord, and failure to provide hot water operates as
a breach that suspends the tenants’ obligation to pay rent.91 Similarly,
there are many contracts that do not allow a party to exit the contract
for any reason but allow substantial discretion. In these cases, the
court will read the contract to imply that a party has a duty to exercise
its discretion in good faith.92 The court “cures” a lack of mutuality and

90. See, e.g., Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248, 251–52 (N.H. 1971) (violation of city housing code constitutes a breach of contract). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79
(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (requiring mutuality of obligation).
91. See Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1973).
92. Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 193 (N.H. 1989) (detailing
legal spaces in which contractual duty of good faith applies).
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in doing so brings the contract within the bounds of private authority—and enforceability.93
That our contract law regime operates in this way is more apparent, and its merits more evident, when we contrast the existing model
with an alternative—one so unattractive that it is merely hypothetical.
Instead of conditionally delegating its authority to regulate transactions, the state could allot certain transactional spaces to its regulatory functions and reserve others as entirely free domains. Such an
approach might appear to strike a reasonable balance between the
state’s interests in securing distributive justice and protecting citizens
from harm, on the one hand, and allowing moral space for exercise of
normative powers, on the other. This model is not wholly alien in that
there are important differences across transactional spheres in existing law, with some spaces heavily regulated and others largely left to
private ordering. For example, transactions between privately-held, sophisticated firms are comparatively lightly regulated, while contracts
entered into by a fiduciary with a conflict of interest are highly scrutinized.94 But the hypothetical model we are considering is one in
which there are contractual domains entirely absent of constraints.
Note that spaces of private agreement that are unregulated by contract do not fit this description because, to the extent the state does
not make itself available for enforcement, agreements are not contracts at all. Similarly, the model suggests transactional domains in
which the state directly controls every aspect of transactions. Imagine
a state that decides which shoes you will wear and from whom you will
get them, at what price. On this model, you do not get to choose even
your shoe size.
While the advantage of the hypothetical model is that courts
need not ever decide whether a particular agreement falls within the
parameters of private authority, the advantage is secured at obvious,
intolerable costs. The burden of exchange in which choice is wholly
absent is not justified by rampant choice in other life domains. The
injustice and outright danger of a wholly unregulated transactional
space is not well purchased by way of bureaucratic bliss elsewhere in
the state machine. Every individual transaction is unjust or oppressive
in the hypothetical model. The model we actually have allows instead
93. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co., 64 F.2d 224, 232
(8th Cir. 1933); Pac. Pines Const. Corp. v. Young, 477 P.2d 894, 896 (Or. 1970) (lack of
mutuality does not make a contract void when there are implied promises).
94. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930–32 (Del.
2003).
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for the justice of individual transactions by bringing each of the states’
interests to bear simultaneously, albeit not equally, on every enforceable agreement for exchange.
Contract scholars have not framed the relationship between state
authority over transactions and individual choice as a conditional delegation of authority. However, it has been clear for some time that,
contrary to occasional rhetoric,95 parties in contract are not inevitably
“free” to contract as they see fit.96 The overturning of Lochner and the
more fundamental rejection of wide-ranging economic liberty
ushered in by the New Deal has more profound implications for contract that we have acknowledged. The post-Lochner era is characterized
by a broad, if imperfect, consensus that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating exchange for purposes other than policing consent.97
The state actively regulates the terms of exchange in a wide range of
activities.98 It has been widely understood that denying the exclusive
right of individuals to control the terms on which they engage in “private” exchange expands the scope of permissible regulation and
thereby reigns in the boundaries of private contract. But scholars have
not taken seriously the implications of shared authority internal to
contract law itself, i.e., the rules that govern legally binding
agreements.

95. See Printing and Numerical Registering Co v. Sampson (1875) 19 LRCh 462 at 465
(Eng.) (“[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that
men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting,
and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and
shall be enforced by the Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider—that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.”).
96. See Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933) (Cohen
stressed that because contracts implicate public policy it is always up to the state whether to
enforce a private agreement; contracts are in sense always public law and private will is not
controlling. Non-negotiated contracts in particular are unrecognizable under the classic
model of entirely voluntary contract.); see also id. at 588–89 (At the end of his article, Cohen suggests “[c]ontracts are standardized not only by statutory enactments . . . but also by
the process of interpretation that courts apply to human transactions and to their formulated agreement. . . When courts follow the same rules of interpretation in diverse cases,
they are in effect enforcing uniformities of conduct.”) We have come quite a bit closer to
Cohen’s vision in which contracts are not presumed binding based on a false theory of
freedom. This Article can be understood as elaborating a normative scheme to replace the
one he rejects.
97. See generally Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 24.
98. See supra notes 8–14.
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Content Dependence in Contract Enforcement

We regard contract as voluntary because contracting parties exercise normative power over their relations with contracting partners.99
We appear to be the source of our own obligations in contract. While
the state does not create the normative power of promise, our legal
power—to create legal obligation—is the intended fruit of a conditional delegation of authority from the state. Under this regime, individuals and state both have say over how transactions proceed.
Contract is the peculiar method by which states mostly leave it to individuals to sort out the terms of private transactions, but as a tool of
governance it is subject to a logic separate from the private practice of
promise. Contractual promises create promissory reasons for parties to
follow through on their agreements, but they generate separate reasons
for the state to enforce those agreements. Because the state has a
range of regulatory interests in contract outside of promise, even if
parties’ intentions control their promissory obligations in contract,
they do not similarly control the scope of a legally binding agreement.
Why not think that enforcing contracts is about enforcing
promises, even if our reasons for enforcing promises include nonpromissory norms? As a descriptive matter, the principle of objectivity
in contract already suggests that the law is uninterested in enforcing a
party’s actual intentions, including what they undertook to promise.100 There are some situations where subjective intent appears to
trump—as where the parties both understand a term differently than
a reasonable third party would have understood it, or where a party’s
claims are limited by her actual knowledge of the other party’s intended meaning.101 But we can understand even those cases as ones
where the court treats the parties’ agreement, or one party’s understanding against her own interests, as more reliable evidence of what
was reasonable for the parties to believe rather than the court’s own
99. See Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 928–31 (1982)
(book review) (stating that a person has normative power where she can change her normative position by communicating an intention to do so); OWENS, supra note 77, at 4–6,
127–28.
100. See, e.g., SAS Inst. Inc. v. Breitenfeld, 167 S.W.3d 840, 841 (Tex. 2005) (“[A] court
interprets a contract by ascertaining the true objective intentions of the parties, based on
the contract language.”); Cochran v. Norkunas, 919 A.2d 700, 710 (Md. 2007) (“[T]he true
test of what is meant is not what the parties to the contract intended it to mean, but what a
reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant.”); Klos v.
Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997) (“When interpreting the meaning
of a contract, it is the objective intent of the parties that controls. The secret or subjective
intent of the parties is irrelevant.”).
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §201 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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ex post reconstruction of events based on skewed and partial
information.
One could argue that the obligations created by promise turn on
a promisor’s objective intent too, such that the law’s interest in objective intent is consistent with the morality of promise. The question
then is whether objective intent should turn on how each party is most
likely to have interpreted the other party’s intentions, or on the most
reasonable interpretation of each person’s intentions. If contractual
commitments arise spontaneously from a vacuum, these two variations
on objective intent might collapse into one: The most reasonable interpretation of intent would be the other party’s best guess about
those intentions.
However, if private contract is to govern the terms of an exchange within the parameters of private authority, it must actually
function as an alternative to mandatory regulation. That is, it must
reasonably specify the duties implicated in exchange—which is to say,
as I argue further below, that it must be read to reasonably specify the
relevant duties. There are many reasons to harness the practice of
promise for the purpose of specifying duties in exchange—it allows
individuals to set their own prices, choose their own products and
providers, and ratchet their warranty protections up and down based
on their particular levels of risk aversion and productive capacities.
Private individuals are usually better at setting the terms of exchange
than a third party like the state. But courts’ reasons for deferring to
our terms are instrumental; contract expands individual agency while
regulating conduct in the course of exchange.102 Although individuals’ authority on the terms of exchange is not entirely epistemic—
grounded in their superior information—it is not fully jurisdictional
either. We are authoritative only inasmuch as the terms we choose are
consistent with the regulatory functions served by contract. Thus, even
if, by virtue of the state’s commitment to private ordering, our
promises generate some content-independent reasons for state enforcement, our terms are effective substitutes for the background legal scheme only where they fall within certain bounds—and that
inquiry is content-dependent.
At this point, it is useful to observe one point of contrast between
interpreting contracts and interpreting law, and a separate point of
similarity. First, the point of contrast: Post-Lochner, individuals have no
inherent claim of authority over the terms on which they deal with
102. See supra Part I.
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others. In this respect, courts interpreting individual promises, in light
of background political duties, are differently situated than individuals or courts interpreting laws in light of related moral principles. At
least in a positivist account of law, the sources of legal obligation do
not depend directly on the moral attributes of law. Political authority
is content-independent to the extent that our reasons for respecting
political authority do not depend on the substance of particular laws.
For that reason, depending on how we construe the scope and basis of
authority and the process of law-making, we (or courts) might care
whether the legal authority that passed a law intended it to prohibit or
permit some conduct.103
To be sure, political authority to generate laws is not boundless.
There are constitutional limits to what lawmakers may do. However,
there are important differences between political authority over laws
and private authority over contracts. Some differences are in kind,
and others are a matter of degree.
Lawmakers do not share authority over the subject matter of most
laws with anyone else. Courts may pronounce that a law is unconstitutional but—outside of exceptional positive injunctions—they do not
substitute their own laws instead.104 Moreover, political authority derives from democratic principles and constitutionally mandated procedures. Lawmakers are not delegated their authority by another
institutional actor; outside of revolutions, “the people” are not a rival
actor, they act through lawmakers. Private authority over contracts is
more meaningfully shared because legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies are live agents of the state that regulate the same
transactional space as private parties, simultaneously, and their terms
displace private terms where terms conflict.
Perhaps because lawmakers do not actively share authority with
anyone else, constitutional limits on lawmaking are less heavy-handed
than restrictions on private contract. Most of the things that democratically-elected lawmakers want to do in contemporary society are
constitutionally permissible.105 For example, if the state wants to regulate pens, it is largely free to ban certain features (e.g., toxic chemicals
103. ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 139 (2005) (stating that deferring to legislative intent when interpreting law is justified “if, and only if, a certain law is
justified on the basis of the expertise branch of the normal justification thesis”).
104. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing judicial
review).
105. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that courts will
rarely strike down legislation because “it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude
in the judges”).
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that both manufacturers and consumers might prefer) or impose certain mandatory remedies (e.g., the right to sue for bodily injury,
which both manufacturer and consumer might prefer to waive).106
Of course, there are exceptions. It is harder to regulate guns.107
There are times in which the Constitution factors heavily in major political decisions, and laws that raise constitutional concerns are especially salient.108 If it turns out that courts see live constitutional
questions in every statute, then to that extent statutory interpretation
is content-dependent too. It might turn out that no real authority in
the world is purely content-independent; nevertheless, in some contexts, authority is more heavily dependent on content than in others.
In contract, the weight of the state is heavy indeed. Most contracts are so bare-boned that they would be unintelligible and unworkable without state-supplied defaults.109 Contracts are expected to
reflect the interests of contracting parties; regulations that overlay
contracts to advance some public end are not anomalous, but pervasive.110 Our interest in moral agency is among the reasons for leaving
it to private individuals to decide how we deal with others, and that
interest may be advanced irrespective of the content of our choices.
But the interests of others must also be consistently well-served by a
system of private ordering; whether these interests are well-served is
content-dependent.111 The force of public reasons for deferring to
private terms of exchange depends in part on the terms that contracting parties choose.
Indeed, political authorities, dissatisfied with the terms on which
whole classes of market transactions take place, regularly override
those terms through consumer, labor, tenant-landlord, antitrust, and
other statutes.112 When courts find the terms of individual transac106. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012) (banning pollutants). See
generally U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (stating that the
limitation of damages for injury to person is prima facie unconscionable).
107. See Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Federal Constitutional Right to Bear Arms, 37 A.L.R.
Fed. 696, 700–03 (1978).
108. See generally Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV.
821, 824–29 (2005).
109. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
110. See generally Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 24 (explaining the optimal governmental action is not to intervene in private affairs).
111. Even Joseph Raz allows, though he does not pursue, the possibility that promissory norms may be justified on grounds that “combine content-independent and contentdependent arguments.” See Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY, AND
SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 210 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977).
112. See supra notes 22–25.
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tions inadequate, they have the doctrinal resources to refuse to enforce those contracts by declaring them unconscionable or against
public policy.113 In all the less dramatic cases, courts should read contracts sympathetically as our effort to carve out some moral space in a
world already saturated with duty.
Contract interpretation differs from legal interpretation in the
kind of authority exercised by the speakers whose words are subject to
interpretation. But contract interpretation is similar to legal interpretation in that the best rules of interpretation depend on our conception of the practice and its purposes. The practice of contract, as a
method of regulating exchange, depends on its legitimacy, or at least
its appeal, on the theory of interpretation it presupposes. A silly theory of interpretation will result in a contract regime that no one would
endorse. A better interpretive practice will deliver a better practice of
contract, and might make it a more attractive alternative to mandatory
regulation than it would be otherwise.
In the context of jurisprudence, Ronald Dworkin’s proposal that
law as a practice involves constructive interpretation of legal rules to
cast them in their best light, or to exemplify the values in law, depends
on his underlying conception of law.114 Similarly, my more modest
point that courts should read contract terms to render them reasonable where possible turns on my account of the function of contract
law. The feature of Dworkin’s conception of law that may most importantly drive his theory of interpretation is his account of law’s authority; similarly, what does work in my account of contract interpretation
is the relatively narrow bases that I identify for contracting parties’
authority.
Legal positivists argue that, though we can expect law to take into
account certain moral values, we ought not to directly reference those
values in interpretation.115 Similarly, many contract theorists imply
that, though freely negotiated contract should be consistent with
background duties like reciprocity and fair exchange (and we have
reason to believe parties take into account duties pertaining to exchange); those duties ought not to inform contract interpretation.116
Without commenting on the jurisprudential debate, my argument
113. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
114. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 52–53 (1986).
115. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 621 (1958) (expressing a belief that referencing values when interpreting law can be
“misleading”). Neil MacCormick, A Moralistic Case for A-moralistic Law?, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 1,
8–9 (1985).
116. See supra note 72.
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here is that because contract is not an inevitable, but rather instrumental regime for governing exchange, we should select its interpretive rules such that they serve underlying normative values. There is
nothing in the apparatus of contract that requires it operates on autopilot, forbidding judges and other state actors from looking backward
at its purposes in the course of implementation.
Notably, in contrast to Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation, I
am not proposing that we read contracts to be the most reasonable
terms of exchange possible. Contract enforcement is content-dependent, but not content-determined. First, normative triangulation kicks
in only where ambiguity is present. To the extent contracts are to be
the work product of private parties at all, they must turn in part on
what those parties said and did. If a court was to read terms to optimize the state’s regulatory interests without any regard for parties’
own intentions, then the regulatory dimension of its interest in contract would overwhelm its interest in allowing parties serious opportunity for self-direction. If the sale of five widgets is read as the sale of
ten, or a price of ten dollars read as only eight, then the court is refusing parties control of quantity and price; it is not sharing authority
over these pivotal terms. Regulatory interests entirely crowd out voluntary obligation with respect to many transactions and terms, but in
such cases terms inconsistent with background legal norms are unenforceable altogether.117 If the agreement as a whole clearly falls
outside the bounds of legal permissibility, then it is not a contract at
all. The court does not interpret those agreements—it does not assign
meaning to the verbal acts of the parties. Instead, it denies the authority of the parties to control the transaction as they attempted to do.
Nothing in the argument here establishes what qualifies as an ambiguous term. The argument addresses the question of how courts do
and should handle terms that they deem ambiguous. In practice,
there will be agreements that a court could interpret in multiple ways
because the initial determination of ambiguity is indeterminate. In
these cases, a court can either strike the agreement as unenforceable,
or it can interpret the agreement to bring it within the bounds of what
is enforceable. Modern courts are more willing to engage in the exercise of pulling contracts within permissible bounds by way of creative
interpretation. Contracts that would have failed for vagueness or lack
of mutuality a few generations ago are now “saved” by allowing parties
to submit evidence that one meaning is more reasonable than others,
117. See generally, Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 215 (N.Y. 1917) (examplifying background legal norms’ prevalence in the court’s decision).
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or by a presumption that each party agreed to have its discretion
cabined by good faith or reasonableness—just enough to establish
mutuality.118 But if there is no legal norm prohibiting enforcement of
what they recognize as an unambiguous term, courts do not read it
contrary to party intent merely to improve it.
There is another reason why courts do not undertake to optimize
contract terms. They have to bring terms within the bounds of reasonableness even as they remain agnostic about the most reasonable term.
That is, a court lacks the resources to declare ten widgets better than
five in a given contract. Because the state has delegated authority over
quantity of goods to private parties, there is no legal norm that supplies an optimal term.
The committed agnosticism of the state as to the ideal terms of
exchange might at first appear to render the analogy to Davidson’s
triangulation inapt. Davidson’s concept of triangulation is bound up
with objectivity, that is, an awareness that thoughts are true or false.119
Only beings that possess the concept of falsehood, and thus see their
own perceptions and those of others as capable of falsity, will use triangulation to prefer interpretations that render utterances largely
true. One might think that the state is incapable of triangulation with
respect to normative facts such as the obligations of parties toward
each other if it must operate as though no objective obligation exists.
While we have reason to believe that we should be responding to a
descriptive statement (“there is a cat on the mat”) in the same way as
others (or at least, observing the same phenomenon), a liberal state
cannot expect contracting parties to perceive normative facts similarly, and judges should not expect parties to see their obligations in
exchange as judges themselves might construe them.
Normative triangulation in the context of contract interpretation
works, however, even if the state recognizes a radically incomplete set
of background obligations. That is, the state does not have to have a
policy about how many widgets should be sold; it can interpret an
ambiguous quantity term to fall within objective boundaries that exclude, for example, no widgets, a wholly indeterminate number of
widgets, or many more widgets than a buyer could secure at a given
price without fraud. Background legal norms usually establish objective boundaries to terms even where they fail to supply a determinate
set of optimal terms.
118. See id.
119. See DAVIDSON, supra note 46, at 45–46.
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The state effectively reads ambiguous terms as if they were uttered by a reasonable person.120 Andrei Marmor describes interpretive statements as counterfactuals about the communicative intent of a
hypothetical speaker.121 In contract, the hypothetical speaker is one
committed to successfully navigating background duties in contract.
Thus, a court interpreting an ambiguous term must answer the question: What would a reasonable person that intends to comply with her
background duties mean by these words? In this way, courts are properly constrained by the words actually chosen and are not merely asking what a reasonable person would do. They can give proper weight
to background constraints while respecting the underlying policy
choice to delegate some authority.
This view of contracts and the correct attitude of judges in interpreting them is subject to the following challenge: I have referred to
the obligations of exchange as indeterminate within a range. But this
suggests the obligations exist before contracting parties “assume”
them. I speak as if parties are themselves only interpreting background duties rather than authoring them.
It is true that the picture of contract offered here entails a certain
externalism about normative powers. Davidson’s perceptual externalism is the view that the meaning of what one says is partly determined
by external objects.122 In contract, parties make promises or grant permissions in response to the facts of prospective exchange. While these
normative powers may operate spontaneously in some contexts,123 in
contract at least, promises are made and permissions are granted in
response to the material facts that drive exchange and in coordination
with another person simultaneously offering promises and permissions of her own. Normative powers are not exercised spontaneously
but in response to external facts. We can use those external facts to
120. See Sutton v. E. River Sav. Bank, 435 N.E.2d 1075 (N.Y. 1982); Embry v. Hargadine,
Mckittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
121. MARMOR, supra note 103, at 23.
122. See DAVIDSON, supra note 46, at 193–204.
123. There is reason to believe that the exercise of normative power may always be
constrained by background duties in a way that most discussion of the concept has obscured. After all, only a moral agent capable of obligation is capable of exercising normative power, but such an agent will always already have obligations attached. The idea of
normative power seems to presuppose a blank slate on which the agent acts where it might
usually be more appropriate to speak of an indeterminate terrain. Inasmuch as we expect
agents to exercise normative powers in response to externally (if partially) determined
normative facts, it might be appropriate to interpret the utterances by which normative
powers are exercised always by reference to background duties. However, this Article is
focused only on the appropriate bases for interpreting normative powers exercised in
contract.
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interpret how those powers were used in the way we use external facts
about the world to interpret utterances that purport to describe them.
Because the interpretation is unabashedly normative, we need not assume that parties successfully exercised their normative powers in a
way that appropriately responds to external facts, or that they aimed
to do so. We are justified in our presumption that they exercised their
legal powers appropriately by virtue of the conditions to which private
transactional authority is subject. To the extent that contracting parties chose terms that cannot be construed as a reasonable response to
their transactional setting, their choice of terms is unenforceable, and
it does not matter what the parties intended to do.
We exercise (or can be presumed to exercise) normative powers
in reaction to the external world in another respect. The moral situation that prompts us to promise or permit is not of our making. We
act on imperfect duties124 even where no one has a particular claim
against us. We seek to comply with vague legal obligations to our partners in exchange that are only substantiated occasionally, ex post
through adjudication. Although we create new obligations to our contracting partners through contract, we do not create them randomly,
but in recognition of existing commitments. Indeed, the normative
powers we exercise in contract might be considerably less valuable instances of moral agency if their exercise involved no moral
deliberation.
Externalism about normative powers, however, does not require
that we view contractual commitments as merely interpretive. Or at
least, this would be a metaphorical and highly reductivist way to describe the activity. I am not claiming, as Patrick Atiyah did, that our
promises are merely evidence for existing duties.125
Even a linguistic description of the external world is original in its
perception. Although committed to the possibility of falsehood, interpreters engaged in triangulation are not committed to the existence
of any single true description of the world we observe. Similarly, moral
agents exercising normative powers in contract can be responsive to
124. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 153 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
1996) (1797). Imperfect duties prescribe a general course of conduct (e.g., giving money
to the poor, cultivating one’s talents, helping one’s friends), but do not require particular
actions or correspond to entitlements in others. Id. (defining imperfect duties as those
which “prescribe only the maxim of actions, not actions themselves,” or those which
“leave[ ] a playroom (latitudo) for free choice in following (complying with) the law, that
is, that the law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and how much one is to
do”).
125. ATIYAH, supra note 68, at 687–89.
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external facts and constraints while still creating obligations that did
not exist before. We can presuppose some similarity in how moral
agents react to external events without assuming that we will all navigate our moral situations in the same way.
Again, the presumption that contracting parties are responding
to the circumstances of exchange in a way that complies with background duties is not an epistemic presumption justified by some belief
about how people actually operate, though it may be buttressed by
some psychological theory.126 Courts presume that parties comply
with some minimal standards of efficiency or fairness in exchange in
the context of contract interpretation because only such a regulatory
presumption justifies deference to the terms parties have chosen. Parties are left to navigate the ethics of exchange only to the extent they
do so in a plausible way. While Davidson’s interpreters may have reason to believe that speakers react to a common world in a similar way,
the state has reason to interpret contracts as if parties are responding
to the facts of exchange in a reasonable way, irrespective of whether
they aimed to do so.127

III.

Normative Triangulation in Interpretation

I have argued that the state’s reasons for enforcing an agreement
depend on its terms and whether they are consistent with background
duties that parties have toward each other—duties that the state could
126. People tend to divide and expect others to divide fixed amounts equally. See Martin A. Nowak, Karen M. Page & Karl Sigmund, Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game,
289 SCIENCE 1773, 1773–74 (2000) (describing experiments in which most individuals prefer to walk away empty handed rather than permit highly asymmetrical division of fixed
amount between themselves and another person). See also Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew
L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts
of Distributive Justice, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 259 (1985); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer,
The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J. L. & ECON. 73 (1982).
127. Because normative triangulation is differently motivated than Davidson’s triangulation, it is not subject to the critique that Marmor lodges against application of the principle of charity in interpreting particular utterances. Marmor says that because “the
principle of charity amounts to the claim that one cannot have a theory of meaning for
natural language whereby the bulk of the speakers’ beliefs would turn out to be false,” the
principle “only makes sense with respect to language and thought as a whole, not to bits
and pieces of it.” MARMOR, supra note 103, at 17. The counterpart principle of charity in
contract interpretation does not only justify the enterprise of contract as a whole but also
enforcement of particular agreements. Marmor may be right that because individuals are
capable of uttering false statements, we cannot operate on a theory of interpretation that
disallows that possibility. But because contracting parties need not be capable of binding
themselves on socially unacceptable terms, we can interpret contracts to disallow that
possibility.
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otherwise enforce in a mandatory regime. Interpreting agreements
thus turns in part on the content of those background duties.
I will now elaborate and narrow that claim. In the first section, I
argue that because state enforcement is content-dependent, contract
interpretation is not limited to discovering party intent. We should
interpret contractual obligations in light of background duties.
The second section introduces some distinctions to locate more
precisely the background norms at issue. We should read contracts in
light of background duties if and only if the background constraint is
of a political sort. Private moral constraints in contract are not relevant to contract interpretation unless they arise from duties that support state functions. But so far as contracts support legitimate state
interests—that is, inasmuch as we defer to parties to regulate themselves instead of regulating them directly—courts should construct contractual intent to ensure private exchange occurs on acceptable terms.
I also compare the role of equitable norms that protect the interests
of contracting parties with the rule of “true” public policy norms that
are intended to protect third parties. Equitable norms should bear
more strongly on interpretation.
Finally, I show how normative triangulation already operates in
several lines of case law.
A. Beyond Intention
As discussed above, Langille and Ripstein introduced the idea of
interpreting contracts by way of triangulation.128 Like Davidson, their
triangulation is epistemic and committed to discovering meaning
without attributing it.129 They are true to Davidson in that they take
the interpreter (courts) to be interested exclusively in speakers’ intentions.130 In fact, they argue that after triangulation, there are no gaps
in contracts that courts must—or may—fill by reference to exogenous
considerations.131 The primary implication of the content dependence for which I argued above is that such an exclusive interest in
party intent is unjustified.
Courts interpreting ambiguous agreements often find themselves
reconstructing the bargain that parties made, as incompletely indi128. See Langille & Ripstein, supra note 41, at 74–75.
129. See generally id. at 63–64 (“[W]hen the relationship between the meaning of an
agreement and the world in which it is made is properly understood, agreements themselves turn out to be highly determinate.”).
130. Id. at 66.
131. Id. at 65.
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cated by its express terms.132 Courts can proceed in two ways. They
can reconstruct the bargain parties actually made, for which they may
be uncertain evidence. Or they can reconstruct a hypothetical bargain. Scholars have challenged the propriety of enforcing a bargain
that parties might have made; hypothetical consent is no substitute for
actual consent.133
One need not rely on hypothetical consent as a normative substitute for actual consent, however, in order to justify reconstructing bargains to reflect prevailing market conditions and applicable norms.
There is another way to understand what courts are doing when they
inquire into the circumstances of contract. They may not be merely
assuming that bargains were intended to reflect market conditions and
background duties but imposing compliant terms as a normative matter, at least where they doubt that contract terms reflect special features of the transaction. Why should they do this? If courts suspect
that departures from market terms often reflect market or bargaining
failure (as a result of transaction costs), and in particular, if they think
that one party is disproportionately bearing the costs associated with a
suboptimal bargain, then they can correct for this ex post by reading
the agreement to render it adequate (reasonable).
Courts do this already because contracts are always incomplete,
and the more straightforward rules of contract interpretation are
sometimes indeterminate with respect to specific terms.134 Thus,
judges are regularly left with the ultimate question before them: What
was “reasonable” for one party to infer what the other intended?135
132. See Sayers v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 7 F.3d 1091, 1094–95 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The
primary objective in contract interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the contracting
parties ‘as revealed by the language they chose to use.’”).
133. See, e.g., Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1551, 1567 (2009).
134. See Timothy Endicott, Objectivity, Subjectivity and Incomplete Agreements, in OXFORD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, FOURTH SERIES 151, 163–65 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000) (“[T]here
is commonly more than one good answer to [the] interpretive question,” so reference to
principles exogenous to party intent is unavoidable.). But see Langille & Ripstein, supra
note 41 (arguing contracts are highly determinate when properly interpreted in light of
context facts).
135. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Family Dental Grp., P.C., 943 A.2d. 1122, 1126–27 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2008) (“[I]ntent . . . is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of
the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and
ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the
contract.”); Dickenson v. State, Dep’t of Wildlife, 877 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Nev. 1994) (“An
interpretation which results in a fair and reasonable contract is preferable to one that
results in a harsh and unreasonable contract.”); Wilkes-Barre Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Corgan,
170 A.2d 97, 98–99 (Pa. 1961) (“Where the language of a contract is contradictory, obscure, or ambiguous, or where its meaning is doubtful, so that it is susceptible of two con-
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Reasonableness is a famously flexible standard. It can be interpreted
in multiple ways.
First, an interpretation may be empirically reasonable in that it is
consistent with how most parties would interpret agreements under
comparable circumstances. Second, a reading may be normatively reasonable in that, as a substantive matter, the agreement is equitable on
that reading. Third, it may be procedurally reasonable to privilege one
party’s understanding of terms over that of the other party because of
their relative expertise or control over the agreement. Finally, an interpretation may be more publicly reasonable in that it may be desirable as a matter of public policy that obligations be construed in that
way.
Sometimes courts use the notion of reasonableness in just one of
these ways. But often courts invoke a default, which may be motivated
by an array of reasons that roughly correspond to the considerations
that bear on the reasonableness inquiry.136
Only empirical reasonableness, or majoritarian defaults, are designed to reconstruct bargains as they really were. Each of the other
types of reasonableness justify incorporating information about the
market and the constraints it imposes on parties independent of parties’ actual intentions.
A view of contract in which parties are free to deal with each
other on any terms will be hostile to every conception of reasonableness save the empirical mode, which amounts to a best guess about
what obligation a party voluntarily assumed. But post-Lochner judges
are no longer guided by the presumption that parties are free to contract on any terms.137 Private ordering is an alternative to direct regulation of markets; the state can reference other kinds of
reasonableness in deciding how to handle a transaction. Contracts are
the product of markets, and markets are in many ways the products of
states. Courts can and do read contracts in a way that preserves and
promotes the market institutions for which states are responsible.
structions, one of which makes it fair, customary, and such as prudent men would naturally
execute, while the other makes it inequitable, unusual, or such as reasonable men would
not be likely to enter into, the interpretation which makes a rational and probable agreement must be preferred. If one construction would make it unreasonable, while another
would do justice to both parties, the latter will be adopted.”).
136. See Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 390–91 (1993) (describing types of defaults).
137. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1973). See also Glaeser & Shleifer,
supra note 24.

74

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

Contracting parties’ intent remains an anchor to contract interpretation under a principle of normative triangulation.138 It will remain central to any account of contract that understands contract to
be a kind of private arrangement between two parties, an arrangement they have been empowered by law to make. I have assumed that
the state chooses to govern through contract in order to allow individuals a greater measure of control in their bilateral relations, and also
to harness the information about values and preferences that individuals tend to possess only about themselves. Contract will not serve
those purposes unless states remain committed to enforcing bargains
as conceived by contracting parties. But these interests of the state in
contract are not exhaustive. They sit alongside other legitimate interests—including interests of justice—in the terms of private exchange.
The best regime of contract must be one that gives adequate weight to
the interest in private agency and private ordering, as well as the interest in regulation that promotes public justice and wealth. I argued
above that because the choice of contract as a method of regulating
exchange necessarily turns on its adequacy in serving interests other
than ones related to private agency, the state has content-dependent
reasons for enforcing contracts. It flows from that fact that interpretation is more than a series of guesses about what parties were thinking
or even what thoughts each ought to have attributed to the other.
B. Interpreting Reasonable Contracts
Contractual promises discharge a range of background duties. In
this section I draw two distinctions. First, some background duties derive from legally enforceable norms, while others are not properly
subject to enforcement by a liberal state. Second, some legal norms
are equitable and concern the interests of the parties to a transaction,
while others are truly “public policy” in the sense that they protect
third parties. Equitable norms may bear more strongly on interpretation than those that concern third parties; at least, public policy
norms inform interpretation under narrower conditions.
I begin by restricting normative triangulation to duties subject to
state enforcement (“political duties”).139 Not all of the duties that moti138. For an explanation of the significance of party intent, see Ronald J. Gilson, Charles
F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100
CORNELL L. REV. 23, 25–34 (2014); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract
Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2005); David A. Dilts, Of Words and Contracts:
Arbitration and Lexicology, 60 DISP. RESOL. J. 41, 43 (2005).
139. The aim of this Article is not to delineate the border between enforceable and
unenforceable obligations—a separate exercise in pure political theory—but to identify
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vate promise are political, i.e., not all background duties are appropriately the subject of legal enforcement in a liberal state. When entirely
private duties motivate contractual promise, those duties ought not to
inform how they are read except inasmuch as the social construction
of those duties is likely to have informed the parties’ own understandings of their agreement. For example, a court charged with enforcing
a contractual promise made between friends should not import any
state-backed conception of friendship or the duties of friendship into
its adjudication of rights and obligations between friends.140 But
courts have a different role when the background duty at issue is one
that is the ordinary subject of legal regulation. For example, a contractual promise made by an employer to an employee in order to discharge obligations emanating from, if not strictly speaking arising
under, a civil rights or employment statute should be interpreted in
light of those background duties. It is the prerogative of the state to
define the conditions of just employment.
Not all political duties are actually legal duties, in the way that not
all principles of public policy recognized by common law courts are
specifically set forth by statute. Political duties between persons are
the private counterpart to principles of public policy. They can be extracted from statutes, gleaned from case law, or otherwise gathered
from the history and state of the law with respect to some issue.141
They are subject to controversy, but their scope of application is relatively narrow. They are incorporated into the decision that courts
make about whether it is appropriate to bring the coercive powers of
the state to bear on the enforcement of a private agreement.
By contrast, duties that arise from personal relations (“personal duties”) are not duties that are ordinarily in the province of state authority. A liberal state does not enforce all moral duties, only those that
support legitimate state functions. It is beyond the scope of this Article to delineate the boundaries of legitimate state authority; the pur-

the role of that boundary in contract interpretation, whatever it may be. Cf. Hanoch Sheinman, Contractual Liability and Voluntary Undertakings, 20 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 205, 217 (2000)
(“Only those morally legitimate expectations that clear the moral-political and institutions
limitations upon legal intervention are protected by the imposition of contractual
liability.”).
140. For the opposite view, see ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND (2011).
141. For the amorphous boundaries of public policy, see Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Wash. Nat’l Arena, 386 A.2d 1216, 1228–29 (Md. 1978) (noting public
policy is extracted from constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions, but not limited to
express statements in those sources).
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pose here is only to link those boundaries with considerations that are
appropriate to bear on contract interpretation.
One way to draw the line between political duties subject to state
enforcement and duties that the state should not set out to enforce is
the harm principle.142 Although it is not my ambition to challenge the
harm principle per se, there are some limitations to using the harm
principle to distinguish between political and personal duties. In particular, the harm principle requires identifying some set of harms that
qualify as triggers for state intervention. The harm principle, though
useful in excluding some illiberal reasons for state imposition, excludes some wrongs we may wish to coercively punish or prevent143
while failing to exclude some types of state coercion we might wish to
rule out. For example, there are many emotional and even material
harms that attend breach of promise in personal relationships, harms
from which we might not wish the state to protect us. Thus, while Dori
Kimel successfully argues that we ought not to enforce promises
merely because breach of promise is immoral, the harm principle
alone does not explain why we should further decline to provide remedy for at least some promises made in the context of intimate
relationships.144
For the limited purposes of this Article, I suggest a different line
between political and personal duties. Political duties are ones that
arise from a general duty to support just state institutions.145 For example, duties to cooperate with police, pay taxes, refrain from physically injuring others, respect others’ property, or maintain real
property so it is not dangerous to others are all important to the functioning of legitimate state institutions. There may be disagreement
142. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 82–83 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds.,
Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
143. See Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 216–22
(2006) (arguing that the harm principle problematically excludes coercion to prevent
harmless trespass and other infringements on independence).
144. See Dori Kimel, Fault and Harm in Breach of Contract, in FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 271, 280–83 (O. Ben-Shahar & A. Poral eds., 2010) (claiming that principle of
autonomy can be used to identify harms relevant for harm principle, but proceeding to
defend one conception of relevant harms in contract against another conception advanced
by Joseph Raz, also on autonomy grounds).
145. See RAWLS, supra note 18, at 334 (“[T]he most important natural duty is that to
support and further just institutions. This duty has two parts: first, we are to comply with
and to do our share in just institutions when they exist and apply to us; and second, we are
to assist in the establishment of just arrangement when they do not exist, at least when this
can be done with little cost to ourselves.”). It is beyond the scope of this Article to defend a
particular conception of political obligation. I will just assume a duty to support state institutions in our society.
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about what justice entails, and therefore, whether a particular law is
actually justified on the grounds of the justification it stated. Any theory of a given body of law describes those laws as serving some legitimate state function. For example, there is deep disagreement about
the function of tort law. Some scholars believe it promotes economic
welfare;146 others believe it enacts corrective justice;147 others believe
it empowers individuals to exact redress for legal wrongs committed
against them.148 But every author contends that the particular function they ascribe to the institution of tort is one that the state is authorized to pursue.149 When this is not obvious, one part of the
account explains why the function attributed to the state in the realm
of tort by that theory indeed falls within the proper ambit of state
authority.
I describe all these duties as political rather than merely legal because not all political duties are legal duties. One can imagine a jurisdiction that does not expressly require individuals to cooperate with
the police. But a law imposing such a duty would advance a legitimate
state purpose. Although there may be disagreement about whether
the duty exists in the absence of such a law (or even in its presence),
there is likely little disagreement that any such duty would be political
in that it would intend to advance a legitimate state purpose in
security.
What are the political duties implicated in contract? Legal duties
are obviously political in the sense used here, meaning subject to legal
enforcement. For example, duties not to discriminate or impair competitive markets both constrain the terms on which we contract.150 Duties not to recklessly induce reliance that has no payoff, or not to
induce another person to confer a benefit on you with the false expectation of compensation, are also already subject to enforcement
through contract principles like promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment.151 Even the duty to compensate for a benefit already re146. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 26–29 (1970); WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 1–24 (1987); STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987).
147. See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 360–74 (1992); see Perry, supra note
59. See also Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1811 (2004) (theory that the law of tort rectifies takings of property rights).
148. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 918–19 (2010) (civil recourse theory).
149. See, e.g., id. at 919–20.
150. See generally supra notes 31, 35.
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (promissory
estoppel); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1937) (“A person who has
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ceived has limited enforcement through the contract doctrine of
moral obligation as substitute for consideration.152 Thus, promises
that make good on any of these background duties should be interpreted in their light.
By contrast, promises made in light of personal relationships of
friendship or family reflect duties of the sort not normally subject to
state enforcement. Personal duties speak only to the morality of private individuals. Thus, the duties that may have motivated or informed those promises are not appropriately used by courts in
interpretation except insofar as they bear on parties’ own intentions.
Beyond the constraints of liberalism, which warn against the state
adopting and promoting a thick conception of the good,153 states risk
undermining the value of private promise by interfering; they therefore have affirmative reasons to avoid their enforcement.154 If states
are not appropriately in the business of regulating the terms of intimate relationships for their own sake—though they have a legitimate
interest in the fairness of their material consequences—then they
should not reference the norms of such relationships when they construct the promises intimates make to each other.
Within the set of enforceable legal norms, it is worth further distinguishing equitable norms from public policy norms. Equitable
norms are ones that control the fairness of the transaction at hand.155
These include norms such as protecting reliance, reflected in the doctrine of promissory estoppel; avoiding forfeiture that corresponds to
windfall, reflected in the doctrine of unjust enrichment; and avoiding
exploitation of vulnerability, as reflected in the doctrine of unconscionability.156 It is easiest to see how these norms, which correspond with
private norms that regulate interpersonal conduct even outside the
law, can be incorporated through normative triangulation. Private
parties are aware of these norms substantively, even if they are not
aware of their legal character. Because compliance with these norms is
the stuff of interpersonal responsibility, it is well within the traditional
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the
other.”).
152. See Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935) (holding a promise made
to employee who saved promisor’s life enforceable against estate of promisor).
153. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) (advocating a liberal conception of justice that is compatible with many conceptions of the good).
154. See Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise, supra note 82, at 750.
155. See Skubal v. Meeker, 279 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Iowa 1979) (“The invocation of equity
jurisdiction permits the necessary flexibility to work out the equities between the parties.”).
156. See supra notes 31, 35 and accompanying text; See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (the unconscionability doctrine).
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functions of private law to give them legal effect through interpretation (in addition to giving them effect through rules of validity and
excuse).
Public policy norms that concern the interests of third parties
raise distinct concerns. They make salient the stake that some third
parties have in a transaction-type. When public policy specifies concrete legal duties it reflects authoritative political judgment about the
balance of relevant interests, and only then do those norms provide
guidance to private individuals. One might wonder whether even “reasonable” parties can be expected to incorporate general public policy
norms into their dealings. To the extent public policy norms are
wholly alien to transactional purposes, imposing them ex post on contracts that did not contemplate them would distort those agreements,
favoring one party at the expense of the other in ways that do not
reflect the merits of the parties’ own conduct.
To avoid such arbitrariness, it is especially important that norms
designed to protect third parties be promoted robustly only where
those norms are expressed in legal duties that attach the individual
party to the transaction. For example, as previously observed, contracting parties are already subject to duties not to engage in anticompetitive or discriminatory conduct.157 Those duties already apply
directly to their own conduct. Even if the terms of a particular transaction do not strictly speaking run afoul of competition law or antidiscrimination law, parties are on notice of the soft legal norms favoring
competition and equality, and parties can be expected to comply with
those norms in the context of private exchange. By contrast, background traffic regulations or environmental policies that disfavor certain transportation or production methods are not so easily promoted
through contract interpretation. While courts can take those legal
norms into account too, it would not be appropriate to do so by way of
a very sticky default that effectively penalizes parties who could not
have been reasonably expected to incorporate those norms into their
private conduct. The upshot is that normative triangulation requires a
series of subtle judgments about the political status of a background
norm as well as its relation to the moral and legal responsibilities of
the parties to a transaction. While some norms are not appropriately
incorporated into interpretation at all, others should be referenced
only on the margin to resolve deep ambiguity. Still, others can be robustly promoted by way of sticky default rules.
157. See supra notes 31, 35 and accompanying text.
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These judgments may seem daunting, but they are familiar and
perhaps inevitable. Courts do not make these judgments from scratch
with respect to any particular agreement. Rather, a court interpreting
a term about product features in an agreement for the sale of microwaves will look to a line of similar cases about small household appliances, or if they are lucky, microwaves using the same cross-licensed
patents. It is the responsibility of the parties in litigation to dig up
those cases, as well as any new safety regulations that bear on how the
court should interpret the contract’s specifications. The next section
discusses how courts already engage in normative triangulation when
interpreting contracts and other legal instruments.
C. Existing Legal Practice
The idea of angled interpretation is already familiar to us in the
way United States courts read statutes to conform to constitutional
principles: A court interpreting a statute will prefer a reading that
saves it.158 Indeed, courts may go further and prefer a reading that
avoids the constitutional question altogether.159 The doctrine has
been used repeatedly by Justice John Roberts in recent years.160 Its
expansive application has been subject to some scholarly criticism, but
even its critics would preserve the long-standing doctrine in some
form.161
One way to understand this rule is that courts aim to respect the
separation of powers and avoid stepping on the toes of the legislature
any more than necessary, instead prompting the legislature to act
158. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng’rs., 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001)
(“We thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism
questions raised by respondents’ interpretation.”); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress.”).
159. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) (criticizing
the practice of avoiding constitutional questions, labeling it altogether “modern
avoidance”).
160. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 856 (2014) (reading in an exception
to the Chemical Weapons Convention given uncertainty about the scope of federal authority to criminalize individual acts of poisoning); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567
U.S. 519, 574–75 (2012) (interpreting Affordable Care Act as a tax rather than command
because the Court had “a duty to construe a statute to save it”); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist.
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 209–11 (2009) (interpreting Voting Rights Act to exclude utility
districts from preclearance process); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010).
161. See Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme
Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2159 (2015); Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 331 (2015).
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where necessary.162 While courts may have reasons to strike down a
particular law, these reasons are outweighed by the general reasons
not to strike down any law. But we might go further: A reading of a
statute under which it is not only constitutional but robustly constitutional delivers a better interpretation—because as a general matter, a
statute that is clearly constitutional is preferable to a statute that
barely survives scrutiny.163 Although reasons to strike down the law
may be outweighed by structural considerations, those reasons do not
disappear. They cut in favor of the “more constitutional” reading.164
As with legislative deference, a court also has many reasons to
respect private ordering and the voluntary dimensions of contract by
declining to substitute its own preferred terms for those selected by
the parties.165 These general reasons cut in favor of “delegating” to
parties the terms of their own exchange and respecting those terms
with narrow exceptions. But the political interest in the terms of exchange is not extinguished by the virtues of private ordering and a
legal culture that recognizes promise; they are merely outweighed by
them. Thus, the residual interest in fair exchange, or in exchange that
does not undermine background justice, still appropriately shapes interpretation of private agreement. For example, if we have pragmatic
and moral reasons for limiting direct invocation of distributive justice
considerations in the regulation of particular transactions, we can
avoid the “distributive question” by interpreting agreements in a manner that neutralizes it.
The normative triangulation proposed here is more familiar than
my argument for it. Like Davidson’s triangulation, it describes an interpretive strategy we continuously deploy. Facts about duty describe a
162. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185,
1204–06 (1992).
163. Trevor Morrison’s “constitutional enforcement theory” of the avoidance principle
is consistent with this approach. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006). The canon of constitutional enforcement
theory provides “a means of enforcing the underlying constitutional provision.” Id. at 1196.
164. The “less constitutional reading” is one that brushes impermissibility. A reading is
not “more constitutional” in this sense just because, for example, it better promotes a constitutional principle. Just as respecting the partial authority of private individuals over their
transactions dictates against twisting contractual language to promote public policy goals
where the transaction does not run afoul of any legal norm, respecting the legislative authority of Congress dictates against distorting statutory language to affirmatively promote
constitutional norms. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U.
L. REV. 109 (2010) (criticizing the canon more generally for undermining the ideal of
interpretive courts as faithful agents of the legislature).
165. Unlike legislative lawmaking, however, private ordering in the broad terms conceived here is not constitutionally mandated. See Schwarcz, supra note 60.
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common moral space inhabited by promisor and promisee (and
court). Duties of all sorts make up our moral world in the way that
hard facts make up our physical world. People speak—and communicate intentions to assume obligations—in a shared context. When a
cashier says that she “will go get five,” we may take her to mean that
she will go get five dollars, and not five cents, because we know that
she owes us five dollars. When we promise to help our friend move, we
understand the promise will be excused if we fall ill because it would
be unreasonable for our friend to hold us to the promise under those
circumstances. We interpret words and underspecified articulation of
obligations in light of what is actually owed.
Courts interpret contracts in the same way. Consider the case of
Vizcaino et al v. Microsoft Corporation,166 in which employment agreements specifically addressed workers: “[A]s an Independent Contractor to Microsoft, you are self-employed and are responsible to pay all
your own insurance and benefits . . . . You are not either an employee
of Microsoft, or a temporary employee of Microsoft.” The Internal
Revenue Service subsequently found that these workers were in fact
employees of Microsoft.167 The question then was whether they were
eligible to participate in certain stock option plans that were limited
to employees.168 The Ninth Circuit described its dilemma: Either the
contracts misinformed employees as to their status, or this language
simply reflected an error by Microsoft.169 It chose to find that
Microsoft meant to label these workers as employees who were therefore eligible to participate in the benefit plans.170 It arrived at this
finding even though the IRS had not yet corrected Microsoft’s classification
of the workers at the time of contracting.171 Neither party could plausibly
have understood the contract to designate the workers as employees
at the time the agreement was entered. The court justified its interpretation of the agreement in this way: “We should, and we do, consider
what the parties did in the best light. In so doing, we do not believe
that we are being panglossian; we are merely acting in accordance
with the ancient maxim which assumes that ‘the law has been
obeyed.’ ”172
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1011.
Id.
Id.
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A similar move was made in Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp.,173 where
the Delaware Chancery Court interpreted a merger agreement so as
to permit the seller to enter talks with another potential buyer, as the
fiduciary duties of its board members required.174 The court reasoned
that even though could not rule out that the contrary interpretation
was what the parties intended, a provision that prevented the buyer
from seeking the best price for its shareholders would be unenforceable.175 It stuck with the reading that rendered the agreement compatible with Delaware fiduciary law.176
Deciphering intent to align it with substantive reasonableness is
by no means a recent invention. A similar explanation is available for
a classic case on objectivity in contract Lucy v. Zehmer.177 There, the
plaintiff claimed the defendant sold him a tract of land, but defendant claimed there was evidence demonstrating it was a joke.178 The
court described a number of facts that spoke to whether it was reasonable for Lucy to believe he had a real deal.179 But lurking in the background was the fact that Zehmer was best placed to avoid confusion.
We might not be confident that Lucy was reasonable in taking
Zehmer so seriously, but we can be confident about the reasonableness of a penalty default that motivates funny people to be more
careful.
Another well-established line of cases consistently demonstrates
how courts can and should interpret agreements in a manner that
brings them in line with background duties. Where agreements once
regularly failed for lack of mutuality of obligation, courts now frequently imply a duty of good faith or a duty to apply best efforts in
order to “cure” lack of mutuality.180 For example, in the classic case of
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,181 Judge Cardozo read an exclusive
agreement between the fashion designer and her agent as containing
173. Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999).
174. See id. at 109.
175. Id. at 108–09.
176. See id. at 109.
177. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
178. Id. at 497–500.
179. Id. at 500–01.
180. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-306(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“A lawful
agreement by either the seller or the buyer for exclusive dealing in the kind of goods
concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts to
supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote their sale.”); Omni
Group, Inc., v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 645 P.2d 727, 729–30 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (reading the right of cancellation, which was subject to feasibility report, as implying a duty to
attempt to obtain such report in good faith).
181. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214–15 (N.Y. 1917).
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an implied obligation on the part of the agent to use reasonable efforts to market the designer’s endorsements. Cardozo’s opinion did
not rest so much on speculation that the parties intended the agent to
have such an obligation, but rather on the court’s confidence that the
parties intended a familiar form of business relations and a legally
binding agreement to govern it.182 The court is “not to suppose that
one party was to be placed at the mercy of the other.”183 Reading the
agreement as wholly lopsided would have put it outside the bounds of
enforceable contract. The court instead interpreted the agreement in
a way that made it normatively defensible, and therefore enforceable.
Courts already reference the normative as well as factual aspects
of context when they interpret agreements. The prevailing rhetoric of
voluntary obligation and its attendant focus on literal intent have obscured the normative dimension of interpretation.

IV.

Conclusion

Critical to the interpretive mode recommended here is my starting point that enforcing contract is an alternative to other legal modes
of regulation. Policymakers could enforce background political (but
not personal) duties through mandatory rules. But policymakers have
many reasons not to pursue mandatory regulation over contract. Besides the efficiency advantages, the voluntary character of contract allows individuals to exercise an important moral capacity; we bring not
only private information but also values, virtues, and vices to bear on
transactions. We express moral personality in our dealing with others,
and contract helps make space for us to do that.
Even though we have these and other good reasons not to enforce many political duties through mandatory rules and to instead
delegate them to private ordering, political duties—and the public interest behind them—persist in a regime of contract. An extensive
body of private law norms “in equity” establishes that the state prefers
contracts in which both parties are treated fairly.184 It also rightly prefers contracts that do not undermine state objectives, like competitive
markets, consumer safety, or civil equality.185 More generally, the state
should not undo with one hand, contract law, what it pursues with its
other hand, its regulatory apparatus. Once we recognize that parties
have no natural or constitutional right to control the terms of private
182.
183.
184.
185.

See
Id.
See
See

id. at 214–15.
at 214.
generally supra notes 31, 35 and accompanying text.
generally supra notes 30–36.
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transactions, the state need not feign blindness or ineptitude in the
context of private adjudication. The public dimensions of exchange
appropriately motivate the way in which exchange is regulated in the
private domain.
Most contracts are between private persons, but contract is a social regime. Contract scholars think a lot about the economic significance of transactions186 and the moral significance of promises,187 but
we have not dwelled long enough on its distinctly legal character and
the problems of authority it raises. Because contracts are enforced by
courts, it is well within the authority of the state to decide how it will
go about this exercise of state power. There is nothing natural or inevitable about deferring to party intention in the course of
interpretation.
Indeed, we override contractual intent all the time through statute, regulation, and the refusal of courts to enforce contracts that are
unconscionable or against public policy.188 But the balance of transactional authority that these practices reflect does not sufficiently inform our formal understanding of how courts handle contracts that
are enforceable.
This Article has been concerned with a subset of enforceable contracts: those which are ambiguous and which therefore present courts
with the very explicit task of interpretation. Courts interpret ambiguous terms in the most reasonable manner possible, and the aim here
has been to emphasize the ways in which the most reasonable interpretation takes into account legal norms outside of contract itself.
The proposed method of interpretation—normative triangulation—responds to the allocation of transactional authority under our
present regulatory state. If ever they were, contracting parties are no
longer free to contract on whatever terms suit them. They share authority over the terms of exchange with the state. Through legal
norms contained in statutes, administrative regulations and case law,
courts lay down many background duties that constrain private
choice. Individuals must negotiate these myriad background duties.
Our choices are legally binding only inasmuch as they fall within the
delineated bounds of private authority.
186. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 293 (2004).
See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998).
187. See FRIED, supra note 55, at 14–17; Shiffrin, supra note 55, at 249–51; MARKOVITS,
supra note 55, at 1417.
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178–179 (AM. LAW INST. 1981);
Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 24; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW
INST. 1981).
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